Antitrust policy: the case for repeal
The author argues that there is no longer any economic theory or empirical evidence to support antitrust laws. He cites such cases as ,Alcoa,, ,Standard Oil,, ,Borden,, and ,Brown Shoe, to illustrate his contention that antitust enforcement has more often than not punished genuine competitive behavior.
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THEORY AND EVIDENCE
in BARRIERS TO ENTRY
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
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Addyston advertising Alcoa allocation aluminum antitrust authorities antitrust enforcement antitrust laws antitrust regulation argued Armentano associated AT&T atomistic barriers to entry Borden buyers Cato Institute cereal Clayton Act collusion companies competitive market process competitive process competitors consumer welfare costs and benefits court discovery and adjustment distributors divestiture equilibrium example Federal Trade Commission Herfindahl Index horizontal agreements illegal incentives industry inefficient innovation joint ventures Journal Law and Economics leading firms legal restrictions less efficient long-run lower prices manufacturer market concentration market output market power market share ment merger guidelines milk misallocated monopoly power output restriction percent perspective potential predatory practices Predatory Pricing price agreements price coordination price discrimination price fixing private-label product differentiation profits public interest reduce reform relevant market repeal resale price restrict production Review risks rivalry rivals Robinson-Patman Robinson-Patman Act rule of reason rule-of-reason approach sellers social efficiency Standard Oil suppliers tend tion traditional antitrust policy
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Research in Law and Economics, Volume 16; Volume 1994
Richard O. Zerbe
No preview available - 1994