The social and political consequences of conglomerate mergers
John J. Siegfried, M. Jane Barr Sweeney, Vanderbilt University. Dept. of Economics and Business Administration
Dept. of Economics and Business Administration, Vanderbilt University, 1980 - Business & Economics - 86 pages
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acquired firm allocative efficiency benefits Benston Business Political Influence business political power Business Protection Act capital characteristics of conglomerates charitable giving community welfare concentrated industries conglomerate firms corporate giving decrease distribution of income diversified firms diversity of conglomerates economic rents economies of scale Effects of Conglomerate efforts to influence employees F. M. Scherer factor owners Federal Trade Commission firm size firm's product geographic dispersion gift giving Gini coefficient glomerate merger incentives income inequality Independent Business Protection individual influence policy input market power interest investment large firms larger firms less Maddox and Siegfried marginal cost market concentration Market Structure merger improves merger may increase Monopoly monopsony number of firms op.cit output political outcomes price changes product diversification product price redistribution skilled labor small firms social goals social property rights suggest tariffs total corporate total firm U.S. Government Printing United States Senate unskilled labor Vanderbilt University worker worker's satisfaction