An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 94
... ment is never willing to incur the loss of A's vote to gain the favor of B , ceteris paribus , because it has no reason to regard B as more important than A. Uncertainty destroys this net equality of influence . The govern- ment may ...
... ment is never willing to incur the loss of A's vote to gain the favor of B , ceteris paribus , because it has no reason to regard B as more important than A. Uncertainty destroys this net equality of influence . The govern- ment may ...
Page 143
... ment . In fact , voters do not directly elect the government at all ; they elect members of a legislature , who in turn choose a govern- ment by majority vote . If , as is very likely , no one party has a ma- jority in the legislature ...
... ment . In fact , voters do not directly elect the government at all ; they elect members of a legislature , who in turn choose a govern- ment by majority vote . If , as is very likely , no one party has a ma- jority in the legislature ...
Page 152
... ment selectors leads to the end of democracy . A second possible outcome is that each voter will decide that he is going to vote no matter what decision he has reached on election day . Having so decided , he cuts off the deliberation ...
... ment selectors leads to the end of democracy . A second possible outcome is that each voter will decide that he is going to vote no matter what decision he has reached on election day . Having so decided , he cuts off the deliberation ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero