Game Theory

Front Cover
MIT Press, 1991 - Business & Economics - 579 pages
7 Reviews
"Both broad and deep, this book belongs on the shelf of every serious student of game theory."
-- David Kreps, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be."
-- Charles Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York University

This text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory -- including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, extensive-form games, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information -- in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science.

"Game Theory" can be used for a first or second course. It presents subgame perfection and Bayesian games with a minimum of detail with technical subtleties included in the advanced sections and uses markers to indicate the suitability of various sections to different audiences. The book is divided into five parts: static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incompleteinformation, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

  

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kreps game teory

Review: Game Theory

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tough a bit Read full review

Contents

Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
3
Strategies
9
Iterated Strict Dominance Rationalizability
45
ExtensiveForm Games
67
Applications of MultiStage Games with Observed
107
Repeated Games
145
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
209
Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
243
Bayesian Equilibrium
345
Reputation Effects
367
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
397
Stability Forward
437
Advanced Topics in StrategicForm Games
479
PayoffRelevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
501
Common Knowledge and Games
541
Index
573

Perfect Bayesian
321

Common terms and phrases

About the author (1991)

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Bibliographic information