Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic
World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001 - Privatization - 39 pages
Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization.
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asset stripping bank-sponsored investment funds Branko Milanovic capital intensity Claessens coefficient for fund-controlled controlled by bank-sponsored controlling shareholder corporate governance cost cross-sectional regression Czech joint stock Czech limited liabilities Czech privatization Czech Republic dividend payment Domestic Fund Dominant Owner expected February 2001 February finance firm owners firm types firm's fixed assets foreign-owned joint stock Frydman fund-controlled joint stock incentives increase indicates significance joint stock companies liability growth rate limited liability companies looting managers Matesova minority shareholders negative and significant OLS OLS output growth rate output growth regressions output(t)-output(t-l))/output(t ownership concentration ownership structure Percentile Percentile Percentile period 1 dividend perverse incentives pi(A profit R-square Regression Results Return on Assets ROA ROA ROA Robust Regression robustness checks selection bias shares Shleifer statistically distinguishable Third Quartile Tobin's Q total assets tunneling types of owners under-performed variables for industry Weiss and Nikitin White's SE White's White's White's White's Wijnbergen World Bank 1998