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agree agreement alleged Allen annoyance appears association Baughman Brothers Bowen boycott breach of contract butchers carrying cause of action coal coercion combination common law compel competition conduct conspiracy conspired court of equity covenant customers damage damnum absque injuria deal defendants demurrer discharge duty employ employer employment engaged enter Essex Trades Council evidence exercise fact federation fendants Fleshers Flood harm Hopkins county House of Lords illegal individual induce inflicted injunction injure the plaintiff injury intent interests interference intimidation judgment jury labor learned judge legal right liberty Lord Lord Herschell loss manufacture Mass master means ment Mogul Steamship molestation monopoly Newark object opinion organized parties persons prevent principle procuring proposition public policy purchase purpose question reason refuse Reported restraint of trade result sell ship society Statute of Laborers threats tiff tion trade unions typographical union unlawful violation wages workmen wrongful act wrongfully
Page 143 - ... contracts designed to effect such an end are contrary to public policy, and therefore illegal. . . . If they should be sustained, the prices of articles of pure necessity, such as coal, flour and other indispensable commodities, might be artificially raised to a ruinous extent far exceeding any naturally resulting from the proportion between supply and demand. No illustration of the mischief of such contracts is perhaps more apt than a monopoly of anthracite coal, the region of the production...
Page 145 - The clear tendency of such an agreement is to establish a monopoly, and to destroy competition in trade, and for that reason, on grounds of public policy, the courts will not aid in its enforcement. It is no answer to say that competition in the salt trade was not in fact destroyed, or that the price of the commodity was not unreasonably advanced. Courts will not stop to inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted upon the public ; it is enough to know that the. inevitable tendency of such contracts...
Page 191 - But if the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act, which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensue from it.
Page 174 - A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.
Page 206 - The other is where a violent or malicious act is done to a man's occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood; there an action lies in all cases.
Page 188 - No man, whether trader or not, can, however, justify damaging another in his commercial business by fraud or misrepresentation. Intimidation, obstruction, and molestation are forbidden ; so is the intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, assuming always that there is no just cause for it.
Page 172 - Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated, in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.
Page 188 - I will only add that, in analyzing or considering the circumstances, I think that regard might be had to the nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the contract; and I think, also, to the object of the person in procuring the breach.
Page 165 - If the meaning of this and similar expressions is that where a person has the lawful right to do a thing irrespective of his motive, his motive is immaterial, the proposition is a mere truism. If, however, the meaning is that where a person, if actuated by one kind of a motive, has a lawful right to do a thing, the act is lawful when done under any conceivable motive, or that an act lawful under one set of circumstances is therefore lawful under every conceivable set of circumstances, the proposition...
Page 185 - Of the general proposition, that certain kinds of conduct not criminal in any one individual may become criminal if done by combination among several, there can be no doubt. The distinction is based on sound reason, for a combination may make oppressive or dangerous that which if it proceeded only from a single person would be otherwise, and the very fact of the combination may shew that the object is simply to do harm, and not to exercise one's own just rights.