Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences
Maria Carla Galavotti
Springer Science & Business Media, Apr 30, 2003 - Philosophy - 345 pages
According to a long tradition in philosophy of science, a clear cut distinction can be traced between a context of discovery and a context of justification. This tradition dates back to the birth of the discipline in connection with the Circles of Vienna and Berlin, in the twenties and thirties of last century. Convicted that only the context of justification is pertinent to philosophy of science, logical empiricists identified its goal with the “rational reconstruction” of scientific knowledge, taken as the clarification of the logical structure of science, through an analysis of its language and methods. Stressing justification as the proper field of application of philosophy of science, logical empiricists intended to leave discovery out of its remit. The context of discovery was then discarded from philosophy of science and left to sociology, psychology and history. The distinction between context of discovery and context of justification goes hand in hand with the tenet that the theoretical side of science can – and should – be kept separate from its observational and experimental components. Further, the final, abstract formulation of theories should be analysed apart from the process behind it, resulting from a tangle of context-dependent factors. This conviction is reflected by the distinction between theoretical and observational sentences underpinning the Hempelian view of theories as nets, whose knots represent theoretical terms, floating on the plane of observation, to which it is anchored by rules of interpretation.
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PAOLO LEGRENZI Naďve Probability
LŔSZLÓ SZABÓ From Theory to Experiments and Back Again
REINHARD SELTEN Emergence and Future of Experimental
WENCESLAO GONZALEZ Rationality in Experimental
ROBERTO SCAZZIERI Experiments Heuristics and Social
GERD GIGERENZER Where Do New Ideas Come From?
DAVID PAPINEAU Comments on Gerd Gigerenzer 141
JEANNE PEIJNENBURG On the Concept of Discovery
DONALD GILLIES Some Comments on Styles
DAVID ATKINSON Experiments and Thought Experiments
DANIEL ANDLER The Advantage of Theft over Honest Toil
MICHAEL STÖLTZNER The Dynamics of Thought Experiments
GIORA HON An Attempt at a Philosophy of Experiment
RAFFAELLA CAMPANER An Attempt at a Philosophy
COLIN HOWSON Bayesian Evidence
IGOR DOUVEN On Bayesian Logic Comments on Colin Howson
2003 Kluwer Academic argument Aristotelian assumptions Atkinson Bacon Bayesian behavior bodies bounded rationality brain Cambridge causal century chemical chemistry chemists cognitive concepts conditionalisation context of discovery correlations empirical epistemic epistemological EPR thought experiment example experimental analysis experimental cultures experimental economics experimental error experimental marks fact Galileo Galileo’s thought experiment Gigerenzer gravitational heuristic hidden variable Hon’s Howson human ibid ideas idols inductive inequalities inference inferential statistics interpretation ISBN justification Klein knowledge laboratory logic Logic Theorist M.C. Galavotti mathematical means mental models metaphor method methodological mind notion null hypothesis ofScience paper philosophy of experiment philosophy of science physical possible practice principle probabilistic probability probability axioms problem psychology quantum mechanics R.S. Cohen random variables real experiments reason scientists Selten semantics sentences Simon statistician strategies string theory structure Studies style of experimental Suppes theoretical tools-to-theories heuristic University Press