Conflict and Tradeoffs in Decision Making
Elke U. Weber, Jonathan Baron, Graham Loomes
Cambridge University Press, 2001 - Business & Economics - 347 pages
What makes some decisions easy and others difficult? Current research in judgment and decision making indicates that conflict plays a decisive role in decision making processes. The essays in this book address questions about the causes of conflict and its effects on decision making and emotions, particularly (but not only) the emotion of regret. Several chapters address the role of attribute tradeoffs, such as that between money and risk, in the measurement of values for policy purposes. The chapters provide overviews of several current research programs and present new data.
Predicting Perceived Differences in Tradeoff Difficulty
The Enhancement of Feature Salience in Dichotomous
The Impact of Emotional Tradeoff Difficulty
Impulse Buying in Ordinary and Compulsive Consumers
Decisions About Prenatal Screening
Judgments of Relative Importance
Allais paradox alternatives amniocentesis asked attribute bad features Baron Beattie cancer chapter choice dilemma choose commodities comparison conflict consequences consumers Contingent Valuation costs currencies decision analysis decision difficulty decision makers decision problem decision processing dimension Dittmar elicit emotional tradeoff difficulty ends objectives estimate evaluation example excessive buying experience of regret factors goals heuristics Houston impact impulse buying inferences injury interpretation of relative involving Jane Jones-Lee Journal Kahneman Loomes loss aversion magnitude mean measure multiattribute negative emotion noncommodities omission bias outcome ovarian cancers Pareto analysis participants patients people's person predict preference judgment preference-response mode probability problem questions range ratings reduce rejection judgment relative importance judgments respondents response mode result risk salience screen self-discrepancies Social Psychology specific spina bifida stakeholders standard gamble Stimulus Set subjects Table theory tion Triple Test Tversky unique-bad pairs unique-good pairs utility values women Zeelenberg
Page 321 - ... balance unchanged, also leaves the probability of the argument unchanged. But it seems that there may be another respect in which some kind of quantitative comparison between arguments is possible. This comparison turns...
Page 322 - ... depends, not merely on the value of the chance, but also on the accuracy of the evaluation, it follows that we ought not to have the same feeling of belief in reference to all events of which the chance is even. In short, to express the proper state of our belief, not one number but two are requisite, the first depending on the inferred probability, the second on the amount of knowledge on which that probability is based.
Incommensurability and Commensuration: The Common Denominator
No preview available - 2003
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