The Nature of the Judicial Process (Google eBook)

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Cosimo, Inc., Jan 1, 2009 - History - 180 pages
4 Reviews
This replica edition of a rare 1921 work gathers in one volume four lectures given by American lawyer and jurist BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (1870-1938), renowned for his contributions to American common law from his benches on the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Here, Cardozo addresses one of the greatest challenges for the law: dealing with gray areas and middle grounds. These lectures cover his solutions for the conundrums presented by: [ "The Method of Philosophy" [ "The Methods of History, Tradition and Sociology" [ "The Method of Sociology, and the Judge as a Legislator" [ "Adherence to Precedent, and the Subconscious Element in the Judicial Process"
  

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User Review  - Schmerguls - LibraryThing

4819. The Nature of the Judicial Process, by Benjamin N, Cardozo. LL.D. (read 20 Apr 2011) This book sets out four lectures which Cardozo gave at Yale in 1921. Tey are still highly pertinent in today ... Read full review

Review: The Nature of the Judicial Process

User Review  - Kenneth - Goodreads

This is an interesting treatment of the implications of precedent. Do judges make law or do they simply interpret old law? How much interpretation is appropriate? Is law separate from morality or ... Read full review

Selected pages

Contents

Introduction The Method of Philosophy
9
The Methods of History Tradition and Sociology
51
The Method of Sociology The Judge as a Legislator
98
Adherence to Precedent The Subconscious Element in the Judicial Process Conclusion
142
Copyright

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About the author (2009)

Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (1870 -1938) was a well-known American lawyer and associate Supreme Court Justice. Cardozo is remembered for his significant influence on the development of American common law in the 20th century, in addition to his modesty, philosophy, and vivid prose style. Cardozo served on the Supreme Court only six years, from 1932 until his death in 1938, and the majority of his landmark decisions were delivered during his eighteen year tenure on the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court of that state. In 1932, President Herbert Hoover appointed Cardozo to the Supreme Court of the United States to succeed Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. The New York Times said of Cardozo's appointment that "seldom, if ever, in the history of the Court has an appointment been so universally commended." Democratic Cardozo's appointment by a Republican president has been referred to as one of the few Supreme Court appointments in history not motivated by partisanship or politics, but strictly based on the nominee's contribution to law. However, Hoover was running for re-election, eventually against Franklin Roosevelt, so a larger political calculation may have been operating. Cardozo was confirmed by a unanimous voice vote in the Senate on February 24. On a radio broadcast on March 1, 1932, the day of Cardozo's confirmation, Clarence C. Dill, Democratic Senator for Washington, called Hoover's appointment of Cardozo "the finest act of his career as President." The entire faculty of the University of Chicago Law School had urged Hoover to nominate him, as did the deans of the law schools at Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone strongly urged Hoover to name Cardozo, even offering to resign to make room for him if Hoover had his heart set on someone else (Stone had in fact suggested to Calvin Coolidge that he should nominate Cardozo rather than himself back in 1925). Hoover, however, originally demurred: there were already two justices from New York, and a Jew on the court; in addition, Justice James McReynolds was a notorious anti-Semite. When the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William E. Borah of Idaho, added his strong support for Cardozo, however, Hoover finally bowed to the pressure. Cardozo was a member of the Three Musketeers along with Brandeis and Stone, which was considered to be the liberal faction of the Supreme Court.

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