Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political EconomyLeadership has long been an important subject in the study of international economic relations. Many scholars give American leadership credit for strong economic growth in western Europe and Japan after World War II. Other scholars have accused leading nations of using their power to the detriment of foreign countries. For example, it is often argued that a failure of both British and American leadership was a cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s. In Leading Questions, Robert Pahre develops a series of formal models to determine under what conditions leadership will be beneficial or harmful for the international political economy. He begins with a simple model of collective action and then adds leadership, security concerns, cooperation, and multilateral regimes to this basic model. He tests each model against a different historical period between 1815 and 1967. Pahre's findings challenge conventional wisdom on international leadership. He finds that a leading state harms others when it has many allies but is good for the international political economy when it lacks allies. Leaders are less likely to engage in international cooperation than are other states, but having a leader in the system makes cooperation among follower states more likely. Cooperation by others may cause the leader to join a system of multilateral cooperation. Pahre presents the technical material in an accessible style. By challenging the conventional interpretations of political economy in several historical periods, Leading Questions will be of interest not only to political scientists but also to economists and historians. Robert Pahre is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. |
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Contents
Leadership and Hegemony | 3 |
A CollectiveGoods Model | 23 |
Stackelberg Leadership and Public Goods | 39 |
The 1920s | 51 |
Security Concerns and Foreign Economic Policy | 73 |
The Rise of Free Trade in Britain 18151853 | 91 |
Bargaining and Cooperation | 123 |
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A. J. P. Taylor actors alliance allies American leadership argues assumption benevolent hegemony bilateral bargains Britain British British openness chapter choices claim coalition Cold War collective-goods comparative statics conjectures contributions to public Corn Laws costs countries Cournot Cournot-Nash economic cooperation effect empirical entente equation equilibrium European example exports externalities Folk Theorem followers foreign formal France free trade Germany Gowa hegemonic enforcement hegemonic theory hypothesis important increase international cooperation international political economy Keohane less mainstream malevolent hegemony Marshall Plan military cooperation military spending Milward monetary multilateral multilateral bargain multilateral cooperation negative nomic one-tailed outcomes Pahre period positive postwar predicts problem public-goods model public-goods provision ratio reduce regimes relationship relative-gains result rivals role share single-play Snidal Stackelberg leader Stackelberg leadership state's strategy tariff tion tional trade agreements trade treaty two-tailed U.S. Openness United Kingdom University Press variable World Zollverein