Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

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Cambridge University Press, Jan 2, 1969 - Philosophy - 203 pages
7 Reviews
Written in an outstandingly clear and lively style, this 1969 book provokes its readers to rethink issues they may have regarded as long since settled.
  

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Review: Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

User Review  - Sam - Goodreads

I rated this a 4 and not a 5 because I'm not sure what all I actually understood. But from what I did understand, I found fascinating. I read this book for my class on the Rhetoric of Style and talked ... Read full review

Review: Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

User Review  - Paul Thiem - Goodreads

I had the privilege of taking Philosophy of Mind with Prof. Searle as an undergrad at Cal. This was required reading for the class. A classic work in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind ... Read full review

Selected pages

Contents

Methods and scope
3
2 Linguistic characterizations
4
3 The verification of linguistic characterizations
12
4 Why study speech acts?
16
5 The principle of expressibility
19
Expressions meaning and speech acts
22
2 Predication
26
4 Propositions
29
Prediction
97
2 Nominalism and the existence of universals
103
3 Ontological commitments
106
4 The term theory of propositions
113
5 Predicates and universals
119
6 Is predication a speech act?
121
7 Rules of predication
123
SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
129

5 Rules
33
6 Meaning
42
7 The distinction between brute and institutional facts
50
The structure of illocutionary acts
54
a complicated way
57
2 Insincere promises
62
4 Extending the analysis
64
Reference as a speech act
72
1 Use and mention
73
2 Axioms of reference
77
3 Kinds of definite referring expressions
81
5 The principle of identification
85
6 Qualifications to the principle of identification
88
7 Some consequences of the principle of identification
91
8 Rules of reference
94
Three fallacies in contemporary philosophy
131
1 The naturalistic fallacy fallacy
132
2 The speech act fallacy
136
3 The assertion fallacy
141
meaning as use
146
5 Alternative explanations
149
Problems of reference
157
2 Proper names
162
Deriving ought from is
175
1 How to do it
177
2 The nature of the issues involved
182
3 Objections and replies
188
Index
199
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About the author (1969)

John R. Searle is Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley.

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