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3-person game arbitrarily close Asscher assume assumption Aumann bargaining set concept behavioral interpretation binary relation characteristic function classical bargaining set Clearly closure coalition structure condition Consider a game cooperative games core corollary 2.1 defined definition 1.1 directed path disruptive property Euclidean space example existence property feasible payoffs game of pairs game theory games with side games without side group rational holds by lemma implies indirect counterobjection indirect demand individually rational introduce justified indirect objection let x€X(B M^CN Maschler maxf minimal Moreover N-M-solution Neumann and Morgenstern Neumann-Morgenstern nonempty notion nucleolus objecting player objection-chain open in X(B path in G(x payoff vector PROOF result follows S-vectors sequence Set for Cooperative set of payoff Shapley side payments side-payment game solution stability concept strong counterobjection subset superadditivity Suppose a contrario theorem 2.1 transfer scheme utility function voting weak objection weakly justified objection X(fi