Internet and Network Economics: Third International Workshop,WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings (Google eBook)

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Xiaotie Deng, Fan Chung Graham, Fan R. K. Chung
Springer Science & Business Media, Nov 29, 2007 - Computers - 598 pages
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The Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2007), held Dec- ber 12–14, 2007 at San Diego for its third edition, provided a forum for - searchers from di?erent disciplines to communicate their research works in this emerging ?eld. Wehadfourplenaryspeakers:KennethArrow,HerbertScarf,VijayVazirani, and Christos Papadimitriou, speaking on economic equilibrium and its history, its solution methodologies (the simplicial structure method and the primal dual method), as well as the computation of Nash equilibrium. This?nalprogramincluded61peer-reviewedpaperscoveringtopicsincluding equilibrium, informationmarket, sponsoredauction, network economics, mec- nism design,socialnetworks,advertisementpricing,computationalgeneraleq- librium, network games, algorithms and complexity for games. December 2007 Xiaotie Deng Fan Chung Graham Please purchase PDF Split-Merge on www. verypdf. com to remove this watermark. Organization WINE’2007 was organized by the Department of Computer Science, Univeristy of California at San Diego. Program Committee Conference Chair Ronald Graham (University of California, San Diego) Local Arrangement Chair Tara Javidi (University of California, San Diego) Program Committee Co-chair Xiaotie Deng (City University of Hong Kong) Program Committee Co-chair Fan Chung Graham (University of California, San Diego) Plenary Speakers Kenneth J. Arrow (Stanford University) Christos H. Papadimitriou (University of California, Berkeley) Herbert E. Scarf (Yale University) Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology) Committee Members Sushil Bikhchandani (University of California, Los Angeles) Samuel R.
  

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Contents

Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids
335
An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism δGain Truthful in Valuation Time and Budget
341
Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences
347
Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of GrossSubstitute Utilities
356
Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets
362
Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes
368
On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets
374
Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games
381

GradientBased Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games
57
Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets
70
Mechanisms and Performance
82
Information Sharing Communities
96
Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions
108
Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions
119
Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in SearchBased Advertising
131
Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search
143
Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions
155
Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction
167
CostBalancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games
179
Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics
191
Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?
208
On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems
220
IncentiveCompatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities
232
FalseNameProof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
245
Mechanism Design on Trust Networks
257
Stochastic Mechanism Design
269
A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks
281
A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests
287
Making Money by Pricing Below Cost
293
PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution
300
Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks
306
Sponsored Search with Contexts
312
Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions
318
Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions
326
The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games
388
Secure Relative Performance Scheme
396
Selfishness Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem
404
The WiFi Roaming Game
412
On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in PlayerSpecific Network Congestion Games
419
The Stable Roommates Problem with GloballyRanked Pairs
431
A PSPACEcomplete Sperner Triangle Game
445
Group Dominant Strategies
457
Weighted Boolean Formula Games
469
Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games
482
Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions
491
Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems
503
To Be or Not to Be Served
515
Ad Auction Design and User Experience
529
An Approximation Algorithm
535
Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search
541
Payperaction Model for Online Advertising
549
Public Advertisement Broker Markets
558
Stability Against Group Deviations in Noncooperative Computation
564
Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
570
Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search
576
On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
584
Characterizing Truthful Market Design
590
Author Index
596
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Page 15 - Arrow, KJ, Debreu, G.: Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy.