The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups"Criticisms of Mancur Olson's theory of group membership and organizational behavior and discussions of the limits of his formulations are not new, but Terry Moe has set them forth in thoroughgoing fashion, has elaborated and extended them, and has made positive new contributions. The result is a book that is valuable and constructive, one that may well revive interest in the systematic study of political groups."—David B. Truman, American Political Science Review "The Organization of Interests is a valuable addition to the literature. It reminds us that the interior life of groups has political significance and gives us a conceptual framework for exploring that life. It balances nicely between the pluralists—who tend to interpret interest group behaviour entirely in political terms—and Olson—who has no satisfactory explanation for behaviour that is not attributable to economic self-interest. In the concept of the entrepreneur Moe gives us a useful analytical device which deserves operationalization. The book is well worth study."—A. Paul Pross, Canadian Journal of Political Science |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Elements of the Analysis | 13 |
The Decision to Join | 22 |
Organizational Formation and Maintenance | 36 |
Internal Politics | 73 |
Departures from the Economic Ideal | 113 |
The Traditional Background | 147 |
Studies of Economic Interest Groups | 168 |
Common terms and phrases
able advantage analysis assumptions bargaining positions bases basic basis behavior benefits bers common interests communications context contributions costs David Truman democratic derive economic selective incentives economic self-interest effect efficacy empirical entrepre factors Farm Bureau Farmers Union formation and maintenance gain group goals group literature group membership group policies group theory ideological imperfect information important individuals inducements influence interactions interest groups internal politics involved James Q kinds larger members lobbying major Mancur Olson marginal costs material associations members join motivational nonmaterial incentives nonpolitical officials Olson's Option organization organizational organizational behavior participants perceptions perspective pivotal play pluralist political activities political goals political success potential members preneur purposive incentives rational reason for joining relationships responsibility role sector Sidney Verba simply small groups social solidary staff strategies studies subgroup leaders suggest supply surplus theoretical theory tions tives types vidual voluntary associations workers
References to this book
Social Dilemmas: Perspectives on Individuals and Groups David A. Schroeder No preview available - 1995 |