The shadow economy, corruption and governance
Edward Elgar, 2008 - Business & Economics - 281 pages
. . . the book provides interesting insights in the correlation and links between institutions, shadow economy and corruption and is worth reading. . . the combination of theoretical and empirical elements makes reading the book worthwhile. In a time, when shadow economy and corruption are main topics on the political as well as on the economic agenda, several aspects highlighted in this book should be discussed by academics and politicians. Dominik H. Enste, Journal of Economics and Statistics This is an outstanding collection of articles on the nexus between the shadow economy and institutional quality. Combining theory with rigorous econometrics, the collection is comprehensive and insightful, making it a work that the students of institutions and development cannot ignore. Axel Dreher, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland This book contributes to the current debates on the shadow economy and related issues of tax evasion and corruption. The approach taken here is one that will develop a better understanding of these related issues, which are increasingly seen as impediments to country competitiveness and economic growth. Economists and policymakers are increasingly focused on how the shadow economy operates. The contributors discuss how effective corporate governance may help to reduce both the occurrence and effects of illegal activities. The book begins by considering institutional governance and how issues such as economic growth and development can be better understood by gaining a deeper understanding of the decision-making process. The importance of collective persuasion and collective decision-making in an institutional context is illustrated. The remainder of the work details a series of empirical studies outlining the role of governance and institutional capacity in assessing economic performance, the role of political competition in reducing corruption and measures of, and influences on, corruption in different countries around the world. Institutions such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF will find much to engage them in this book as will policy makers in government and research policy agencies. It will also hold great appeal to academics (postgraduate and above) in the fields of political economy, economic development and international economics.
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A Dynamic Theory of Collective Persuasion
On the Optimal Sanction Structure When Individuals are Imperfectly
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administrative corruption Algeria analysis auditing bribes burden capture chapter coefficient collective persuasion Corruption and Governance currency demand dataset detection probability developing countries dummy DYMIMIC econometric Edward Elgar effect empirical enforcement envelope wages estimation Estonia example explanatory variables factors firm's firms GDP per capita growth hidden economy higher household impact imperfect information important income countries increase indicator individuals informal activity institutional interaction Journal Kaufmann levels of corruption logit measure nomic OECD OECD countries official economy official GDP optimal ordered probit p-val perceived percent petty corruption plenary debate political competition Polyarchy probit model property rights quintile regulation repeat offenders Research sample sanction Schneider 2004 seriousness of tax shadow econ shadow economy activities significant social partnership statistically studies survey Table Tanzi tax evasion tax morale taxation threshold transition countries Tunisia underground economy University College Cork vote voting paradoxes WBES World Bank