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Agusun Author Title Bagwell and Ramey Bradford DE LONG Christian DUSTMANN cL)/3 in period costs are high defecting firm defection payoff Djordje Suvakovic OLGIN Domenico di Fiesole duopolist duopoly entrant has high entrant has low entrant's costs entry deterrence entry occurs equilibrium output EUI Working Papers European University Institute expected payoff expected second-period payoff Fabio CANOVA firm 1H firm lH's firm lH's defection follows the pooling game with unknown H incumbent defection HAMMOND high-cost entrant high-cost firm high-cost incumbents incumbent produces industry cost parameter Jane MARRINAN John MICKLEWRIGHT KIRMAN Louis PHLIPS low-cost entrant low-cost incumbent Marginal cost maximizes its expected Model ECO noncooperative Oligopolistic Oligopoly ECO Oligopoly Limit Pricing one-period game Out-of-equilibrium beliefs output that maximizes period payoff Peter Point Geometry Pooling equilibrium pooling strategy potential entrant prior probability reaction functions rival San Domenico second-period output sequential equilibrium strategy Stephen MARTIN two-period game Unemployment unknown cost types w(cH WALDMANN