Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda
Historical experience has shown that successful strategies to combat terrorism that is spawned by serious, deep-rooted problems have involved first crushing the current threat and then bringing about changes to make terrorism?'s reemergence less likely. While deterrence of terrorism may at first glance seem to be an unrealistic goal?--concepts such as co-optation and inducement cannot be expected to be effective for dealing with terrorists who have the unshakable commitment of an Osama bin Laden?--it may be possible to influence some members of terrorist groups. Such groups are not simply single entities; rather, they are systems, with diverse elements, many of which could be amenable to influence. Thus, to sustain its counterterrorism efforts for the long term, the United States must develop a multifaceted strategy that includes attempting to influence those elements of terrorist systems that may be deterrable, such as state supporters or wealthy financiers living the good life while supporting terrorists in the shadows. The U.S. strategy should comprise not only military attacks, but also political warfare; placing at risk the things that terrorists hold dear; a credible threat of force against any state or group that supports the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist uses; and maintaining cooperation with other nations that are also engaged in the war on terror. At the same time, the strategy must preserve core American values, including discriminate use of force and maintaining due process in the provision of speedy justice.
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WHY DETERRING TERRORISTS IS SO DIFFICULT
Chapter Three PRINCIPLES FOR INFLUENCING TERRORISTS
Chapter Four BROAD ISSUES OF STRATEGY
Chapter Five SOME CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
Chapter Six CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Appendix A COLD WAR CONCEPTS OF DETERRENCE
actions actors Afghanistan allies American values analysis approach Arab avoid Ayman al-Zawahiri believe biological weapons Broad-Front Strategy challenges civilian cognitive Cold War COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS concept of deterrence counterterrorism Davis Decisions Decomposing the System decomposition defeat Defense detail More detail deterring terrorism dilemma discussion disruption effective effects-based operations efforts Escalation Ladder Esposito example extremist Figure foot soldiers forces framework goal groups Hoffman important individuals influence component Islam Islamist Israel Israeli issues Jihad Laden mass-casualty weapons ment Middle East military modeling Muslim Nonetheless nuclear Operation Enduring Freedom Osama bin Laden Pakistan Palestinian planning political warfare potential problem Qaeda system RAND recognized religious retaliation root cause rorist rules of engagement Saudi Arabia September 11 Soviet tactics Taliban targets terrorist organizations terrorist system terrorists hold dear threat tions tolerance Type A terrorists U.S. government United Utgoff violence vulnerabilities Wahhabiism war on terrorism Ziemke
Page 86 - Before joining RAND, Dr. Davis was a senior executive in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Page xvi - There is a lesson to learn from this for he who wishes to learn. . . . The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in the last week of 1979, and with Allah's help their flag was folded a few years later and thrown in the trash, and there was nothing left to call the Soviet Union.