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analysis analyze assume assumption asymmetric information Austen Smith beliefs that assign cheap talk games choose a point clearly closed rule collusion proof committees concave utilities conflict of interest construct coordinate system couple define dimension dimensional distribution empirical equilibrium beliefs equilibrium strategies example exists a fully Expert 2's experts report sequentially fully revealing equilibrium Gilligan and Krehbiel implied important indifference curve induce a point information transmission informational theory intuition Krishna and Morgan legislative organizations Lemma linearly independent locus maker's ideal point Marco Battaglini Multiple Referrals Nash Equilibrium observe the true observes the wrong opposed biases optimal choice out-of-equilibrium beliefs outlier principle paper pareto superior players point that Expert policy maker believes policy maker's ideal policy space possible posterior probability profitable deviation prove quadratic utilities qualitatively revealing equilibrium exists satisfied Sequential Equilibrium strictly concave sufficient condition tangent theory of legislative truthful fully revealing utility functions vector