The Works of John Locke, Volume 1 (Google eBook)

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Thomas Tegg, 1823 - Philosophy
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Page 82 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 83 - First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.
Page 120 - ... nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz.
Page 278 - Who will render to every man according to his deeds: To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life: But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil...
Page 148 - WHITENESS, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with; and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.
Page 14 - This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done. 4. What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.
Page 2 - I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
Page 3 - If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
Page 94 - I suspect, a confused notion taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny.
Page 13 - I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one ; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

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