requirements of interstate commerce. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co. 238 U. S. 275, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 760, 69: 1306

Editorial note.

State regulation requiring carriers to furnish cars to shipper as interfering with interstate commerce. 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 984.

Regulating relation of master and servant.

Conflict of laws as to burden of proof in suit under Federal employers' liability act, see Conflict of Laws, 6.

Applicability of Employers' Liability
Act to ocean-going ships, see Mas-
ter and Servant, 17.

Partial invalidity of state statute, see
Statutes, 78.

76. The intention of Congress to take control of the subject so as to invalidate existing state statutory regulations cannot be inferred from the enactment of the employers' liability act of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 232, chap. 3073, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1316), since that statute, having been held to be an invalid exercise of the power of Congress, was not a law for any purpose. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581, 57: 966

Cited in note in 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 268, on state regulations of relations between interstate railroads and their employees.

77. Since Congress, by the act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), took possession of the field of the employer's liability in interstate transportation by rail, all state laws upon the subject are superseded. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, 68: 1062

78. The liability of an interstate railway carrier for personal injuries resulting in the death of a servant while employed in interstate commerce is measured by the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), which supersedes all applicable state laws. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 57: 1031

Cited in note in 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 45, on
Federal employers' liability act.

79. The laws of the several states, in so far as they cover the same field, were superseded by the enactment by Congress of the employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1171), regulating the liability of interstate railway carriers for the death or injury of their employees while engaged in interstate commerce. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 66: 327

80. The Federal employers' liability act of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 232, chap. 3073, U S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 891) , by undertaking to regulate commerce in the District of Columbia and the territories of the United States necessarily superseded any otherwise applicable provisions of the New Mexico act of March 11, 1903, governing suits for death and personal injuries. El Paso & N. E. R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21, 64: 10S

Cited in note in 47 L.R.A.(N.S-) 41, on Federal employers' liability act.

81. The employers' liabilitv act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 6*5, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657), governs an action by an injured employee against an interstate railway carrier to the exclusion of any applicable state statutes, although the pleadings contained no reference to the Federal act, where the evidence on the trial shows that the train on which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the injury was engaged in interstate commerce. Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U. S. 454, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, 69: 671

Cited in note in L.R.A.1915C, 76, on Federal employers' liability act.

82. The common-law right of the father of a minor employee of an interstate railway company, injured through the latter'a negligence while he was employed in interstate commerce, to sue the company on account of expenses incurred for medical attention to his son and for the loss of the latter's services, did not survive the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8657), in which Congress declared when, how far, and to whom, such carriers shall be liable on account of accidents to employees in the specified class. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U. S. 360, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620, 61: 1409

83. The limitation of the responsibility of a railway carrier under the employers' liabilitv act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), § 1, for injuries to its employees resulting from defects or insufficiency in places of work or appliances to those caused by such defects and insufficiences as are "due to its negligence," governs an action brought under that statute regardless of the measure of responsibility prescribed by the local statutes. Seaboard Air Line R." Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, 68: 1062

84. Congress intended the Emplovers' Liabilitv Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 6*5, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § S657), regulating the liability of an interstate railway carrier in case of the injury or death of an employee when employed in interstate commerce, to be as comprehensive of those instances in which it excludes liability, i. e., where there is no causal negligence for which the carrier is responsible, as of those in which liability is imposed, and in both classes such act is paramount to, and exclusive of, state regulation. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 61: 1057

85. The entire subject of the liability of interstate railway carriers for the death or injury of their employees while employed by them in interstate commerce is so completely covered by the provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8637), as to prevent any award under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act (X. Y. Laws 1913, chap. 816; Laws 1914, chaps. 41, 316), where an employee was injured or killed without fault on the railway company's part while he was engaged in interstate commerce, although the Federal act gives the right of recovery only when the injury results in whole or in part from negligence attributable to the carrier. New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, 61: 1045

86. The operation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8657), governing the liability of interstate railway carriers for the death or injury of their employees while employed in interstate commerce, cannot be interfered with by a state either by putting the carriers and their employees to an election between the provisions of that statute and a state Workmen's Compensation Act, as is attempted by N. J. Laws 1911, chap. 95, or by imputing such an election to them by a statutory presumption. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 536, 61: 1057

87. The common-law rule with respect to the employee's assumption of risk of injury from a defective appliance governs an action brought under the employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), where such appliance is not covered by any Federal statute enacted for the safety of employees, to the exclusion of anv state statutes which, like N. C. Revisal "1005, § 2(146, abolished the assumption of risk as a bar to an action by a railway employee for an injury attributable to defective appliances furnished by the employer, since otherwise the subjectmatter would be controlled by the laws of the several states, and not by the Federal statute, which, in § 4, abolishes the defense of the assumption of risk only when the violation by the carrier of a Federal statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the death or injury of an employee. Seaboard Air Lino R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635.

58: 1062

88. The distribution of the damages recoverable, under the act of April 22, 1908,

from an interstate railway carrier, for the death of an employee while engaged in interstate commerce, is governed by the provisions of that statute, which necessarily supersede any applicable state legislation. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep 160, 56: 327

89. Nothing in the state statute for the distribution of personal property can defeat the right of the childless widow of an interstate railway employee who was fatally injured while employed by the carrier in interstate commerce, to the entire net proceeds of a judgment for the resulting damages recovered by her as administratrix in an action against the carrier, whether her action .was based upon the provisions of § 1 of the employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), making every such carrier liable in damages for the negligent death of such employee "to his or her personal representative for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and if none, then of such employee's parents; und if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee," or upon the provision of § 9, added by the act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat, at L. 291, chap. 143, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1324), that "any right of action given by this act to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then to such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury," since such provisions govern the distribution of the damages to the exclusion of any applicable state legislation. Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U. S. 363, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. 58: 638

Cited in notes in 48 L.R.A.fN.S.) 988; L.R.A.1915C, 52, on Federal employers' liability act.

90. A declaration stating a good cause of action under the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, TJ. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), may be treated as affording a basis for a recovery under the state law after first eliminating the allegation that the injury, occurred in interstate commerce, which the proof demonstrated was unwarranted, since by so doing the court is merely giving effect to a rule of local practice, the application of which was not in anywise in contravention of the Federal statute. Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, 58: 1226

Cited in note in L.R.A.1915C, 47, on Federal employers' liability act.

91. State statutes which, like 2 Ida. Rev. Code, §§ 6926, 6909, render a wilful violation or omission of duty on the part of a railway employee whereby human life or safety is endangered punishable as a misdemeanor, and make wilful or negligent conduct which causes a collision of trains and the resulting death of a human being a criminal offense, have no bearing on the right of the motorman of an interstate interurban electric railway to recover damages from his employer for injuries sustained in a collision because of defective power or train brakes, since his right to recover depends upon the emplovers' liabilitv act of April 22, 1008 (35 Stat, at L. 65, chap. 149, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657), and the safety appliance acts of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat, at L. 531, chap. 196, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8605), and March 2, 1903 (32 Stat, at L. 943, chap. 976, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8613), to which all state legislation affecting the subject-matter must yield. Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 683, 60: 1125

92. Congress has so far occupied the field of legislation relating to the equipment with safety appliances of cars moving on interstate railways bv the act of March 2, 1893 (.27 Stat, at L. 631, chap. 196, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8608), as to invalidate, as applied to freight cars moving between points within the state on a railway engaged in interstate commerce, the provisions of Burns's (Ind.) Rev. Stat. 1908, § 5280, requiring railway companies to place secure grab irons or hand holds on the sides or ends of every railway car. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304, 59: 661

93. Congress has so acted upon the subject of the hours of labor of interstate railway employees by enacting the hours of service act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat, at L. 1415, chap. 2939, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1321), as to preclude a state, during the period between the date of that act and the time when, by its express terms, it should go into effect, from making or enforcing as to such employees a local regulation limiting hours of labor. Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756, 58: 1149

Annotated in 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 266; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 138.

94. The clause in the hours of service act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat, at L. 1415, chap. 2939, U. S Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1170), regulating the hours of labor of interstate railway employees, by which its operation is postponed for one year, precludes a state from making or enforcing during the interim a local regulation affecting the hours of labor of such employees. Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington ex rel. Atkinson, 222 U. S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, 56: 237

95. Congress had so acted upon the subject of the hours of labor of interstate railway employees by enacting the hours of service act of March 4. 1907 (34 Stat, at I* 1415, chap. 2939, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1170), as to preclude a state, during the period between the date of that act and the time when, by its express

terms, it should go into effect, from making or enforcing as to such employees a local regulation limiting hours of labor. Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington ex rel. Atkinson, 222 U. S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160.

56: 237

Cited in note in 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 267, on state regulation of relations between interstate railroads and their employees.

96. The subject of the hours of labor of the employees of interstate railway carriers using the telegraph or telephone in connection with the movement of trains is so far removed from the field of state regulation by the hours of service act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat, at L. 1415, chap. 2939, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1321), as to invalidate the provisions of N. Y. Laws 1897, chap. 415, as amended by Laws 1907, chap. 627, prescribing a still shorter day's work for block system, telegraph, and telephone operators and signal men on railroads, as applied to a telegraph operator of a railway carrier engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, who is employed to space trains by the use of the telegraph under the block system, and to report trains to other offices and to train despatchers. Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756,

58: 1149

Cited in note in L.R.A.1915D, 414, on hours of service laws.

Pare food laws.

97. There is no conflict between the provisions of the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat, at I* 768, chap. 3915, U. S. Comp Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1354), for the prevention of the adulteration and misbranding of foods and drugs when the subject of interstate commerce, and the requirement of Iowa Code (Supp. 1907, §§ 5077-a6 -5077-a24), as applied to sales by importers in the original packages, that there shall be stated in the labels on concentrated commercial feeding stuffs offered for sale in the state the name and percentage of the diluent or diluents or bases. Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784, 56: 1197

98. Congress did not, by the passage of the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 768, chap. 3915, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1354), for the prevention of adulteration and misbranding of foods and drugs when the subject of interstate commerce, preclude the enactment of Ind. Acts of 1907, chap. 206, prohibiting sales of concentrated commercial feeding stuffs in the original packages unless there be compliance with its requirements as to inspection and analysis and the disclosure of the ingredients, including the minimum percentage of crude fat and crude protein, and the maximum percentage of crude fiber, and with its incidental provisions for the filing of a certificate, for registration, and for labels and stamps. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715,

56: 1183

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99. Permitting a sale of cans of a mixture of glucose and refiner's syrup shipped into the state only when the labels prescribed by Wis. Laws 1907, chap. 557, governing the sales of food products, are substituted for those affixed in an honest attempt to comply with the food and drugs act of June 30," 1906, is an unlawful attempt by the state to discredit and burden legitimate Federal regulations of interstate commerce, to destroy rights arising out of the Federal statute which have accrued both to the government and the shipper, and to impair the effect of a Federal law which has been enacted under the constitutional power of Congress over the subject. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, 57: 754

Annotated in 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 984; Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39.

100. Congress having, by the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 768, chap. 3913, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1354), made adulterated and misbranded articles contraband of interstate commerce, could, in order to make the legislation effective, authorize, as it did in § 10 of that act, seizures for confiscation and condemnation so long as the articles remained unsold, whether in the original packages or not; and such means of enforcement may not be thwarted by state legislation, like Wis Laws 1907, chap. 557, under which cans of a mixture of glucose and refiner's syrup which have been removed from the boxes in which they were shipped in interstate commerce and arc held upon the shelves of the importers for sale, must bear only the labels required by the state law, to "the exclusion of those "affixed conformably to the Federal law. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, 57: 754

101. There is no repugnancy between the pure food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 768, chap. 3915, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8717), which is directed against the adulteration and misbranding of articles of food transported in interstate commerce, and the prohibition of K. D. Laws 1911, p. 355, against retail sales of lard otherwise than in bulk, unless put up in 1, 3, or 5pound packages, net weight, or some multiple of these numbers. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440, 60: 771

Editorial note.

State regulation as affected by Federal Pure Food Law. 47 L.R.A.(N.S-) 985.

d. Police power of state.

Bee also supra, 46; infra, 127, 228, 247.

102. The police power of a state cannot justify a direct interference with interstate commerce. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Kaw Vallev Drainage Dist. 233 U. S. 75, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, 58: 857

U. S. Dig. 62-61.—18.

II. Control of navigable waters and navigation.

a. In general.

Conflicting state and Federal regulation, see supra, 64.

Tonnage and port regulation, see infra, VII.

Authority of War Department over ship canal, see Canals.

Condemnation in aid of navigation, see Eminent Domain, 2-5, 9-11, 13-22, 26.

Matters affecting pilots, see Pilots.

Federal regulation of sponge taking, see Sponges; Waters, 1.

Matters as to waters generally, see Waters, I.

Relative rights of state and United States in navigable waters, see Waters, I. a.

Improving navigation as infringing riparian rights, see Waters, 18, 20.

See also infra, 123.

Fixing harbor lines.

In aid of navigation as within constitutional protection against taking iroperty without compensation, see Eminent Domain, 9, 13, 14.

103. The action of a state in providing by statute for fixing the lines of ordinary high and low water in certain rivers, and that the lines so fixed shall be firm and stable for the purposes intended by the statute, however effective as between the state and riparian owners to fix a permanent boundary at the high-water line so fixed, gives such owners no rights which will prevent Congress, in the exercise of its right to regulate commerce, from fixing harbor lines in accordance with the high-water mark as changed by the wearing away of the banks in the course of years. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340, 56: 570

Regulating oyster Industry.

Inspection laws, see infra, 249.

Destruction of oyster plantation in interest of navigation, see Eminent Domain, 11.

104. Rights under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution or under the 14th Amendment are not infringed by the provisions of N. J. act March 24, 1899, § 20, as amended by the act of March 22, 1901, under which a conviction may be had for using a dredge in tidal waters of the state for the purpose of catching oysters upon leased lands without the consent of the lessees. Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. S. 67, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22, 52: 106

6. Bridges.

License tax on carrier by water as interference with commerce, see infra, 156-158.

Delegation of power as to, see Constitutional Law, 14.

Requiring changes in bridge, as within constitutional protection against taking property without compensation, see Eminent Domain, 22.

105. The removal of the existing railway bridges over a navigable stream, which form necessary parts of lines of interstate commerce, cannot be ordered by a state court even in the avowed expectation that such order will lead to the desired elevation of the bridges, which the state court could not order directly without the authority of the Secretary of War. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Kaw Vallev Drainage Dist. 233 U. S. 75, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, 58: 857

Cited in note in L.R.A.1915B, 487, on duty of railroad to construct or alter bridges over public drainage ditches.

106. The Secretary of War is not invested with arbitrary power in the premises by the provision of the river and harbor act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat, at L. 1121, 1153, chap. 425, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3545), § 18, empowering him, when satisfied that a bridge over an interstate water way is an unreasonable obstruction to navigation, to require such changes or alterations as will render navigation reasonably free, easy, and unobstructed, since he is bound, before making any decision or taking final action, to notify the parties interested of any proposed investigation by him, to give them an opportunity to be heard, and to allow reasonable time to make such alterations as he finds to be necessary to free navigation. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, 54: 435

107. A bridge over an interstate water way, although erected under the sanction of a state, and although not an illegal structure, or an unreasonable obstruction to navigation in the condition of commerce and navigation at the date of its erection, must be taken as having been constructed with knowledge of the paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states, and subject to the condition or possibility that Congress might, at some time after its construction, and for the protection or benefit of the public, exert its constitutional power to protect free navigation as it then was against unreasonable obstructions. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, 54: 435

108. The mere silence of Congress and its failure directly to interfere and prevent the original construction of a bridge erected under the sanction of a state, over an interstate water way, imposes no constitutional obligation upon the United States to make compensation for subsequent changes or alterations which the public good, in its judgment, requires. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, 54: 435

109. A bridge company convicted for failure to make the alterations in a bridge over an interstate water way which the Secretary of War, acting under the authority of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat, at L. 1121, 1153, chap. 425, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3545), § 18, requires, was afforded

the reasonable opportunity to be heard, contemplated by that law, upon the question whether the bridge was, in fact, an unreasonable obstruction to navigation, where the company had full notice of the action of the officer of Engineers, who, under the order of the Secretary, made a tentative examination of the facts, and appeared at the regular final hearing before that officer, with liberty to contest the facts, and introduce any evidence pertinent to the case, and the decision of the Secretary of War was based on the Engineer officer's report of all the facts adduced before him, and which constituted the basis of his conclusion that the bridge was an unreasonable obstruction to navigation. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, 54: 435

110. A bridge over the Mississippi river constructed under the authority of the special act of Congress of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat, at L. 244, chap. 246), which expressly reserves the right of alteration or amendment so as to prevent or remove all material obstructions to navigation by the construction of bridges, is subject to the provisions of the river and harbor act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat, at L. 1121, chap. 525), § 18, empowering the Secretary of War, when satisfied, after a hearing of the parties interested, that a bridge over a navigable water way of the United Statesis an unreasonable obstruction to navigation, to require such changes or alterationsas will render navigation reasonably free, easy, and unobstructed. Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, 55: 699

111. A bridge company which has erected a bridge over the Ohio river, in accordance with the requirements of the Acts of Julv 14, 1862 (12 Stat, at L. 589, chap. 167), and February 17, 1865 (13 Stat, at L. 431,. chap. 38), each of which declared that a bridge erected under its provisions shall be a lawful structure and be recognized and known as a post route, and neither of which contains any reservation of the right to alter, amend, or revoke the franchise, wasgiven no irrepealable franchise to maintain its bridge precisely as it was originally constructed, and no vested right entitling the bridge company to compensation under U. S. Const. 5th Amend., in case Congressshould thereafter, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, require changes to be made in the interest of navigation, but the authority of Congress to oompel changes was precisely the same asif the bridge had been constructed under state legislation without license from Congress, or had been constructed under congressional consent or usage, coupled with an express reservation of the right of revocation or amendment. Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. S. 409, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158, 61: 395

112. The declaration by Congress in the Acta of July 14, 1862 (12 Stat, at L. 569,

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