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An execution sale of registered real estate of a bankrupt without leave of court which was held illegal and void. Damlv v. Mazzuchelli, 550.
Evidence in proceedings brought in the Land Court by the trustees in bankruptcy of a corporation for the cancellation of certain memoranda of incumbrances including a memorandum of an execution sale to the respondent upon which it was held that the trustee in bankruptcy succeeded to the rights of a receiver of the corporation as they existed at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy. Ibid.
In the above described proceedings it was held that the right of the receiver in behalf of creditors of the corporation was by relation to the time of the filing of the bill in equity for his appointment and not to the date of his appointment, over two and one half months later. Ibid.
BILLS AND NOTES.
The facts, that, upon the indorsement and delivery by the payee of a negotiable promissory note, the indorsee, on an order in writing by the payee directing him “to pay the proceeds of the discounting or purchase" to a third person, with the consent. of such third person charges the amount thereof to the third person's credit in an account between the indorsee and the third person wherein the balance was in the indorsee ’s favor, constitutes a consideration for the indorsement. Commercial Credit Co. v. M. M cD¢mough Co. 73.
A note and mortgage of personal property, ‘given by a husband to his mother without consideration and for the pm'pose and with the intention of preventing his wife from reaching his property in any proceeding brought by her against him to secure her marital rights to support and maintenance, is void as against his wife. Doane v. Doane, 106. '
At common law, every indorsement upon a negotiable instrument is presumed to have been made at the place where the instrument is dated. Walling v. Cuahrnan, 62.
In an action by the trustee in bankruptcy of a bank in Michigan which discounted certain promissory notes dated and payable in Colorado and made by a Colorado corporation in Illinois, one of which notes was indorsed in Illinois, against the indorser, who was a married woman, it was held that it did not appear from the record that the obligation of the defendant first became complete by delivery of the notes in Michigan. I bifl.
In the above described action evidence offered by the defendant to show that, when the notes were discounted, the defendant was domiciled in the State of Michigan and that by the law of that State, the defendant was not liable as indorser upon the notes and was not estopped to set up the invalidity of her indorsement, was excluded and a verdict ordered for the plaintiff and it was held that on the record, the domicil of the defendant was immaterial. I lrid.
Bill: and Notes (continued).
In the above described action it was held that on the record it could not be inferred by this court, in order to overcome the legal presumption that the indorsement was made where the notes were dated, that the defendant indorsed the notes with a view to having them delivered in l\'Iichigan, knowing that she would not there be bound by her indorsement; nor could it be assumed that the bank knew that the defendant’s indorsement was that of a married woman, domiciled in Michigan, and that delivery of the notes was accepted with knowledge that the indorsement legally was worthless. Walling v. Cushman, 62.
In the above described action it was held that the defendant was estopped from setting upin defence that her indorsement was made in Michigan. I bid.
The facts, that, upon the indorsement and delivery by the payee of a negotiable promissory note, the indorsee, on an order in writing by the payee directing him “to pay the proceeds of the discounting or purchase" to a third person, with the consent of such third person charges the amount thereof to the third person's credit in an account between the indorsee and the third person wherein the balance was in the indorsee's favor, constitute a consideration for the indorsement. Cmnmercial Credit C0. v. M. McDowough Co. 73.
Holder In Due Course.
The fact that an indorsee of a negotiable promissory note took title to the note with knowledge that it was given as a part of a conditional sale of a motor truck containing certain covenants, warranties and guaranties to be performed by the payee and indorser of the note, does not prevent the indorsee from being a holder in due course under G. L. c. 107, § 80, where it does not appear that at the time when he received the notes as indorsee he had notice or knowledge of a breach of any of such covenants, warranties or guaranties. Cmnmercial Credit C'0. v. M. llIcD01w'ugh C0. 73.
A suit in equity may be maintained by the owner of certain land, which is near a quarry let to a town in order that it may obtain material for its public ways, against the superintendent of streets of the town, under whose direction blasting operations are being carried on in the quarry, to enjoin him from operating the quarry in such a manner as to cause stones or fragments of stone to fall or be thrown upon the plaintifi’s premises and requiring him so to regulate the blasting that the plaintiff's house will not be damaged by vibrations caused by the blasting. Steven; V. Dedham, 487.
In a suit of the above description where it appeared that pieces of rock had fallen on the plaintiff's premises and that some of the “deep blasts” had caused vibrations of a house on the premises, causing cracks to appear in the plastering, and that glass had been cracked in a greenhouse on the premises, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to the remedy sought although it appeared that the “operation of the quarry is a valuable asset to the town” and the “blasting operations have now reached a stage which renders it unlikely that any rocks from blasting will be thrown upon the plaintiffs premises during the future operations and the only source from
nnmx. 615 ‘ 1 Blasting (continued). which she may be likely to suffer is through concussion from the larger blasts," and that other houses in the neighborhood had not been shaken. Stevens v. Dedham, 487.
In the suit above described, where the defendant admitted “that the quarry could have been and may be operated in such a manner that rocks would not be thrown upon adjoining premises and that houses in the vicinity would not be shaken” it was held that a finding of a master that the probable danger of substantial damage or injury to the plaintiff from the operation of the quarry would not be commensurate with the injury which would result to the town if it should be obliged to give up the operation of the quarry did not prevent the plaintifi from having the injimctive relief sought. Ibid.
Circumstances under which it was held that a delivery of a registered municipal bond, without indorsement, or instrument of assignment or transfer, by the registered owner was held to be a valid gift inter vivos which could not be avoided by the personal representative of the donor after her death. Mangan v. Howard, 1.
Evidence in an action by a surety company against a construction company to recover premiums upon certain bonds, upon which it was held that findings, that the plaintiff had waived its right to continue to collect premiums until it should receive written notice of the completion of the contract and also its right to collect premiums after the date of actual completion of the work, were not unwarranted. T itle Guaranty &' Surely C0. V. Fred T. Ley & C0. Inc. 113.
The city council of Boston has full jurisdiction to hear charges preferred against the superintendent of the Boston almshouse and hospital seeking his discharge, which were made by persons purporting to act as the board of infirmary trustees and were given to the mayor of the city, who forwarded them to the council with a recommendation that the coimcil “consider the imperative necessity of taking immediate action under R. L. c. 19, § 23, and amendments thereto.” Donlan v. City Council of Boston, 557.
The trustees of the Boston Public Library, and not the mayor of the city of Boston, are the ofiicers or agents of the city with whom should be filed a sworn statement of a claim of a subcontractor under St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, for labor performed and furnished and materials used in the construction of an addition to the Boston Public Library being built under the provisions of a contract which was executed under St. 1890, c. 418, § 4, on behalf of the city by the trustees of the Boston Public Library, although by § 6 the mayor was required to approve the contract in writing. Otis Elevator C0. v. Long, 257.
A filing of a sworn statement of such a claim with the mayor alone would not be a compliance with St. 1909, c. 514, §‘.Z3. Ib1kl.
In a suit under _St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, where several subcontractors were permitted to intervene and file claims it was held that the intervenors were entitled to interest only from the date of the filing of their respective petitions and not from the date of the filing of their respective sworn statements of claim under St. 1909, c. 514, §23. Otzlw Elevator Co. v. Long, 257.
Findings by the master in the suit above described that a note given by the main contractor to an intervening plaintiff was accepted by that plaintiff as a payment on account, which were affirmed by the judge -upon exceptions to the report, were also affirmed by this court after a careful examination of the facts reported by the master. I biki.
The requirements of St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, were held to have been satisfied in the circumstances above described by the mailing of a letter, postage prepaid, containing the sworn statement of the claim, which was addressed to and was received by the trustees of the Boston Public Library, or by the delivery of a letter, containing such sworn statement and addressed to the trustees of the Boston Public Library, to the clerk of that corporation; but it was further held that the mere mailing of such a letter, without it being found to have been delivered to the addressee, was not sufiicient. Ilrid.
A real estate broker, who is employed toprocure a tenant for certain property by one who is the real owner, but not the title holder, of the premises and who informed him that he was the owner, is entitled to a commission when he procures a tenant who is willing to lease on terms satisfactory to the person so employing him. O'Neill v. Reardon, 120.
In an action by a real estate broker to recover a commission for procuring 3;. tenant to lease a portion of a certain building, where there was evidence that the plaintiff, who was employed for that purpose by the defendant, procured a tenant with whom an agreement to make a lease was signed by both parties which, the defendant testified, was “satisfactory to both parties," it was held that the circumstance, that the parties failed to carry out the agreement by executing a lease in accordance with its terms, did not affect the right of the plaintiff to receive a commission. Ibid.
In the above described action it was held that on all the evidence a verdict should not be ordered for the defendant and the case was for the jury. Ibid.
In the above described action it was held that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was not without consideration. I bid.
In the above described action where it appeared that the lease was never executed and there was evidence that the reason was because certain alterations of the premises proposed therein did. not comply with building regulations required by St. 1907, c. 550 it was held that the plaintiff's right to recover a commission was not affected by the inability of the tenant legally to occupy the building after the proposed alteration. I bid.
Evidence in an action for a commission alleged to be due for procuring for the defendant a customer ready, able and willing to purchase his real estate on terms approved by him. upon which it was held that findings were warranted that the plaintiff had procured a customer, known and acceptable to the defendant, at a price for which he had authorized the sale of the prop
erty; that the terms of sale either were not in question or were such as necessarily followed from an unqualified acceptance of a positive offer; and that the defendant without good reason and without reference to the responsibility of the customer refused to go forward in the transaction. Whitkin v. Markarian, 334.
It also was held in the above described action that it could not be ruled that upon all the evidence the defendant was entitled to judgment. I lnli. ‘ In the above described action it was held that upon such facts being fOI1I1d, the defendant was precluded from contending, in order to defeat the plaintifi"s recovery, that other evidence was necessary to prove that the customer
was ready, able and willing to purchase. I bid.
Upon an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Mimicipal Court of the City of Boston dismissing a report containing findings, upon conflicting evidence, for the defendant in an action against a husband and wife by a real estate broker for a commission for procuring a customer for certain real estate, where the wife signed her own name and that of her husband to an agreement of sale containing a clause agreeing to pay the plaintiff a. commission, it was held that no question of law was open on the record. Halbert v. Brooks, 471.
BURNING WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD INSURER.
Evidence at the trial of an indictment charging that the defendant, before a burning of his dwelling house by another with intent to defraud certain insurance companies, “did incite, procure, aid, counsel, hire and command" the commission of the crime, upon which it was held that a request by the defendant that a verdict of not guilty be ordered on the ground that there was no evidence that he intended to defraud the insurers properly was refused. Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 250.
Evidence at the trial above described, upon which it was held that the jury were warranted in finding that the alleged principal was either a joint principal or the sole principal, and that a motion that a verdict of not guilty be ordered on the ground of variance properly was denied. I bid.
It was within the discretion of the judge at the trial above described, after the defendant had named several parcels of real estate which he had owned and had testified that he owned a. certain shop which he previously had forgotten to mention, to permit him to be asked in cross-examination whether he had forgotten to mention the shop because he had a fire there. Ibid. C
St. 1913, c. 393, as amended by Spec. St. 1917, c. 223, and Spec. St. 1919, e. 79, were awarrantable determination by the General Court that the reason for the public use for which land was taken by the city of Cambridge under the authority of Sts. 1892, c. 341; 1893, c. 337, no longer existed so far as a part thereof called “The Ih-ont" was concerned, and are constitutional. Wright v. Walcott, 432.
The requirement of Spec. St. 1917, c. 223, that the statute should be accepted by vote of the city council of Cambridge before it should become operative, isvalid. Ilrid.