A Financial-agency Analysis of Privatization: Managerial Incentives and Financial Contracting

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Lehigh University Press, 1997 - Political Science - 264 pages
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This monograph analyzes two important questions that emerge during the privatization of a state-owned enterprise: who should the chief executive officer be and what financial contract should be offered. The authors argue that the resolution of the chief officer selection and financial contracting problems can accelerate any efficiency gains realized by the enterprise.
 

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Contents

Preface
9
Acknowledgments
11
Introduction
15
Agency Theory and the Contract Problem
31
Critical Elements of Financial Contracting with the CEO of an Enterprise Undergoing Privatization
52
Further Analysis of the Financial Contract
105
Empirical Analysis of Financial Contracting during Privatization
152
Two Case Studies of Privatization
186
Summary of Work and Ideas for Future Research
226
Index
251
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