A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

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OUP Oxford, Nov 1, 2007 - Business & Economics - 336 pages
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The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

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CHAPTER 1Introduction
Part 1The Setting
CHAPTER 2Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements
CHAPTER 3Coalitions Cooperation and Noncooperation
Part 2A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation
CHAPTER 4Irreversible Agreements
Symmetric Games
CHAPTER 6Applications
CHAPTER 10Reversible Agreements With Externalities
Part 3A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation
CHAPTER 11Blocking
CHAPTER 12Irreversible Commitments
CHAPTER 13The Blocking Approach in Real Time
CHAPTER 14Directions
Subject Index

The General Case
CHAPTER 8A Framework for Reversible Agreements
CHAPTER 9Reversible Agreements Without Externalities
Author Index

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About the author (2007)

Debraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (Rio De Janeiro), the People's University of China (Beijing), and the London School of Economics. He is a Permanent Research Affiliate of the Instituto de Análisis Económico (Barcelona). Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University.

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