A New Institutional Economics Perspective on Industry Self-Regulation
The idea of self-regulation as an instrument capable of mitigating socially undesirable practices in industries - such as corruption, environmental degradation, or the violation of human rights - is receiving substantial consideration in theory and practice. By approaching this phenomenon with the theory of the New Institutional Economics, Jan Sammeck develops an analytical approach that points out the critical mechanisms which decide about the effectiveness of this instrument. By integrating theory with practical examples of self-regulation, this study highlights the necessity to look at the institutional incentives of an industry, in order to come to a sound judgement about the feasibility and effectiveness of this instrument in a given situation.
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1 Introduction and Problem Exposition
2 A Concept of Demand for Industry SelfRegulation
3 The Supply of Industry SelfRegulation
4 The Incorporation of Concept and Context
5 Implications of the Institutional Perspective
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actors adverse selection analysis apparel assumption Attributes of Self-Regulation auxiliary transactions bounded rationality BSCI Ceteris paribus chemical industry codes of conduct collective commitment companies comparatively competitive disadvantages compliance concept Consequently constraints construction industry contract contribute cooperation Corporate Social Responsibility corporations corrupt practices costly costs associated Costs of coordination Costs of sanctioning Costs of Supply credible Datamonitor determine developed economic transactions effective self-regulation enforcement environmental ethical standards ex post example feasible firm’s Greif hence incentives incurred individual firm industry self-regulation industry’s information asymmetries Institutional Economics institutional environment institutionalize interdependence legitimacy measurement problems mechanisms mitigating monitoring Nike norms organization Ostrom Pareto efficient payoffs possible potential prescriptions regulation relevant reputation retailers self-regulation arrangement self-regulation initiative self-regulation regime set of rules situations socially desired behavior specific stag hunt structure suppliers theory transaction costs transaction partners Transformation costs unforeseen contingencies valuation violation Williamson