A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law
Three questions surround the interpretation and application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. What is its underlying purpose? Is it necessary to demonstrate actual or likely anticompetitive effects on the market place when applying Article 82? And how can dominant undertakings defend themselves against a finding of abuse? Instead of the usual discussion of objectives, Liza Lovdahl Gormsen questions whether the Commission's chosen objective of consumer welfare is legitimate. While many Community lawyers would readily accept and indeed welcome the objective of consumer welfare, this is not supported by case law. The Community Courts do not always favour consumer welfare at the expense of economic freedom. This is important for dominant undertakings' ability to advance efficiencies and for understanding why the Chicago and post-Chicago School arguments cannot be injected into Article 82.
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achieve allocative efficiency Antitrust application of Article applying Article 82 argued Article 82 ec benefit chapter chicago school Commission 2003 commission’s common market community courts Competition Law Review competition policy conflict considered consumer welfare customers dG comP Discussion Paper dominant position dominant undertaking ec treaty economic freedom economic power effects on consumers efficient competitors eliminated European Competition Law examine Exclusionary Abuses exclusionary conduct firms foreclosure France TÚlÚcom freedom and consumer freedom of competition fundamental right GlaxoSmithKline goal Guidance Paper guidelines harm consumers harm to consumers harvard structural school Hoffmann-La Roche ibid individual economic freedom market integration market power mestmńcker Michelin Microsoft nomic objective of Article objective of consumer ordoliberal parallel trade paras presumption process of competition promote consumer welfare rebate restrict social market economy soft law structure of competition sumer supra note Tetra Pak tion tive trading parties undistorted competition United Brands welfare standard Zoja