A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data
Dept. of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1996 - Game of strategy (Mathematics) - 25 pages
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1993 The Economic 2x2 bimatrix games action distribution adjustment dynamics Alan Richards average belief learning model Buyer-Seller data c s 1-s Capital Mobility Cheung and Friedman Cheung JiaHe Lilian Chinn Jeffrey coefficients convergence Cournot Daniel Friedman December Donald Wittman Empirical equation Exchange Rate expected payoff fictitious play Frankel Hawk-Dove data individual players interior Nash equilibrium interior steady International Capital Job Displacement Kenneth Learning and Replicator Lori G mean square error Menzie Chinn Michael Michael Hutchison mixed Nash equilibrium Monetary Nash equilibrium value Nirvikar Singh normal form game November number of free October opponents outperforms the replicator payoff function payoff matrix pure Nash equilibrium R(st replicator dynamics replicator model replicator variable RMSE Root mean squared Santa Cruz September 1995 significantly simple belief learning single population data single population game single population Hawk-Dove stability Stock Market symmetric three parameter Unit Root Yin-Wong Cheung JiaHe Yin-Wong Cheung Kon Yin-Wong Cheung Menzie