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Modeling Criminal Street Gangs as Organizations
Economic Model of a Gang as an Institution for
6 other sections not shown
actions approach asset forfeiture assets Assumption behavior buyer Cali Cartel cartel caught committing cheating chooses cocaine collusion committing a crime conspiracy context cooperative cost criminal activities criminal enterprise criminal gang criminal groups criminal law criminal organizations criminal street gang Crips decision decision problem drug markets economic effect effort choices effort levels externalities federal first-order conditions focuses forfeiture function gang activity gang members gang membership gang structure Gangster Disciples given group penalty group-based horizontal organization illegal markets imposed incentive increase interaction involved law enforcement Law Review leader liability loss function maximize Model Penal Code money laundering monitoring moral hazard Nash Equilibrium number of crimes offense operations organizational structure organized crime organized gangs outcome participation penalty structure prison gangs problem profits Proposition provides punishment quantity and effort repeated games reputation RICO risk rival gangs role seller social loss statutes strategies transactions vertical organization