A model of myopic corporate behavior with efficient stock markets and optimal management incentive contracts
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
absence of trading Australian National University boost current cash certainty equivalent income Chance and Rich choose effort choosing action Chris Jones contract that implements denoted efficient stock markets Elizabeth Savage Equilibrium Short-Term Bias equity swap ex interim firm Flavio Menezes Garvey given by c(a Glenn Jones Holmstrom induce the manager insider trading John Quiggin level of managerial linear contracts link her pay liquid long-term share price Management Incentive Contracts Manager Cannot Trade manager chooses manager to trade manager will choose manager's action manager's contract manager's effort choice manager's effort incentives managerial trade market participants Myopic Corporate Behaviour optimal contract optimal incentives order condition P.F. Apps participation constraint prevented from trading principal-agent setting rational expectations realization reduced result risk neutral shareholders risk-averse short-term share market short-term share price short-term stock price Simon Grant Stein stock appreciation rights term share price trading costs trading problem transactions cost variability verifiable zero