A model of sequential takeover bidding

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Cornell University, January, 1988 - Business & Economics - 410 pages
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Contents

The Sequential Takeover Bidding Model 13
8
Sequential Equilibrium Strategies of the Stage Game by p
26
Sequential Equilibrium Strategies of the Repeated Game by
57
Previous Research on Takeover Contests
74
Empirical Implications and Results
95
Results of Bid Premia Tests 157
126
4 Normality and Equal Variances Tests for Bid Premia 160
132
Results of Excess Returns Tests
186
Normality and Equal Variances Tests for CPEs
188
Conclusions and Future Work
190
List of Bidders by Repeater Status 195
Bibliography 199
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