A quality-signaling rationale for aftermarket tying
Marius Schwartz, Gregory Werden, United States. Dept. of Justice. Antitrust Division. Economic Analysis Group
Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1995 - Business & Economics - 19 pages
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4th Cir Aaron Director aftermarket tying Amicus Curiae antitrust law Asymmetric information Carl Shapiro cert competitively supplied consumer beliefs consumer surplus consumers benefit consumers observe demand curve durable product durable proves Eastman Kodak Econ equipment markets explanation for tying exploitation Froeb Game Theory Gregory guarantees and warranties high-quality durable high-quality seller Image Tech Image Technical Services informational imperfections ISOs argued Jean Tirole Kodak's argument locked-in consumers low-quality durable low-quality seller marginal cost market power Merger monopoly price nondurable offer low quality Ordover policies pooling equilibrium price discrimination prior to purchase profits from tying Proposition purchase a unit quality durable quality is offered Quality-Signaling Rationale Rationale for Aftermarket rationale for tying sellers of high-quality separating equilibrium service prices Solicitor strategy stylized facts suggested that Kodak summary judgment supra note Surplus Conditions tied complement tied product tying contract tying is impossible tying is observed tying lawful U.S. Department zero