## A Refutation of Arrow's TheoremThis book attempts to refute a well-known theorem in social choice theory by questioning both the truth of its premises and the validity of its argument. Arrow emphasizes that four 'reasonable' conditions be placed on democratic constitutions and from these assumptions derives his theorem, which states that it is impossible to satisfy these four conditions simultaneously. This book not only refutes the theorem, but, in addition, shows that its philosophical basis is antidemocratic and should be abandoned. It is important to show that there is no justification for the claim that democracy is flawed, even if that claim be made only in a purely logical sense. |

### What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

### Contents

Introduction | 1 |

Democracy and Random Procedures | 5 |

Collective Rationality | 15 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

### Common terms and phrases

actual democracies American ancient approval voting Arrow Arrow's argument Arrow's proof Arrow's theorem assume assumptions Athenian candidate Church's theorem Church's thesis claim Collective Rationality conception Connexity consider constitution decision procedure democratic choice democratic decision democratic practice democratic social choice dictator Economic Edited election empirical example fallacy of composition four conditions human imagine impossibility proof inconsistency Independence of Irrelevant individual invalid invalid proof Irrelevant Alternatives John mathematical logic means metalanguage Nondictatorship nontransitive outcome paradox of voting Pareto Principle person Peter Suber philosophical political possible predicate Preference Implies Choice preference ordering premisses President problems random devices random procedures random selector random techniques reasonable recursive refutation self-referential argument sense shark social choice mechanism social choice theory social decision social preference society sucker suppose symmetrical deadlock theorists thesis transitive relation Transitivity University Press valid values violate volumes vote trading voters wheel York