A risk-information perspective on the marketing of M&A advisory
How do companies choose their investment bank M&A advisor? What roles do sales presentation, the bank's reputation, its relationship with the company, and the company's experience with banks during previous transactions play? Can universal banks build on their commercial banking relationships with the company when applying for an advisory mandate? How well do reputation and other vehicles help decrease perceived risk associated with the M&A advisor choice, and how reliably do they yield subsequent satisfaction? What can banks learn from these interdependencies for a successful go-to-market, both externally (marketing and sales) and internally (culture, organization, incentive systems)? The topic of how companies choose their M&A advisor has not been in the focus of any publication to date. By building on risk theory, information economy, principal agent theory, and product classifications, this publication develops a theoretical framework in which real-life marketing problems are being addressed. A European-wide survey among M&A advice users is used to quantitatively validate or reject the so-derived hypotheses, before further-reaching implications are being discussed.
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Achleitner[5 banker bracket banks brand bulge bracket characteristics choice decision choosing an M&A Citibank commercial banking relationship company's competitive selection component of risk concepts consequence component considered constitute core sample corporate dependent Deutsche Bank differentiated discussed example expected experience type information factors Figure Goldman Sachs higher highly hypothesis impact important role increase individualisation individuals industrial information search instance investment banking relationship J.P. Morgan Chase Lazard LLC Lehman Brothers M&A advisor choice M&A project M&A transaction major bracket mandate means merger Merrill Lynch moral hazard Morgan Stanley non-competitive selection operationalised P-value paragraph perceived risk perspective potential previous execution product class product quality purchase funnel question questionnaire renowned banks repeat buyers resp risk associated risk relievers sales presentation signal vehicles solicitation events specific strategies surrogate switchers task programmability test results third party tion transaction volume uncertainty component universal banks utility variable