Access by the poor in Latin America's utility reform: subsidies and service obligations
Omar O. Chisari, Antonio Estache, Catherine Waddams Price, World Institute for Development Economics Research
UNU/WIDER, 2001 - Business & Economics - 22 pages
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adverse selection allocative Argentina benefits Buenos Aires capital Catherine Waddams Chisari and Estache competition Compulsory Service concession Concession Contracts connection charges consumers consumption cost of service coverage criteria cross-subsidies decile demand discussed East Anglia economic electricity ensure example expansion extension financing fixed charge fixed costs fixed network free-riding fund impact implemented imposed incentives income distribution increased access Increasing bloc tariffs industries Infrastructure Reform Latin America Latin American experience long term low income households marginal costs maximising mechanism monopoly moral hazard Moreover Obligatory service OECD Oftel operators particularly Paz-El Alto percent poor potential problem profit programme reduced regulatory retirees revenue caps rural areas sanitation services sector Self-exclusion service regulation suppliers supply costs target technologies Telecommunications telephone unemployment rate Universal Service Obligation UNU/WIDER urban users Utilities Waddams Price Washington DC Water and Sanitation Wodon World Bank X X X