What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
AN ACCESS POINT THEORY OF TRADE POLICY
INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE POLICY IN POSTWAR
2 other sections not shown
access point theory amount of lobbying argues assumption average tariff rates benefits bicameralism chapter coding coefficient collective action Configuration Congress constituencies Council countries decline delegation democracies Democratic dependent variable discuss dissertation divided government economic variables effect on tariff effects of institutions election electoral districts empirical examine exports factor mobility focuses Franzese free trade free-traders GATT higher tariff rates Hiscox hypotheses imports increasing the number industries influence instance interest groups Karol lead legislators legislature levels of protection liberalization literature logroll lower tariff rates majoritarian Model negotiations number of access number of electoral number of parties OECD parties in government partisanship party discipline policy outcomes policymaking process political institutions pooling predicted preferences President presidential protectionism protectionist lobbying Protectionist party provides receptive relevant RTAA sample short-term significant specific suggests tariff bounds U.S. Congress unemployment unit roots veto players vote Westminster system