Action, Intention, and Reason
In this collection of essays, Audi develops a general theory of action ranging from the nature of action and action-explanation to free and rational action. Eleven of the chapters were previously published. They include such well-known contributions to the philosophy of action as "The Concept of Wanting"(1973), "Intending" (1973), "Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion" (1974), and "Acting for Reasons" (1986), and some more recent papers the influence of which is already being felt: "Self-Deception and Practical Reasoning" (1989), "Weakness of Will and Rational Action" (1990), "An Internalist Conception of Rational Action" (1990), and "Responsible Action and Virtuous Character"(1 991). Two chapters a renew essays: "Volition and Agency" and "Modalities of Knowledge and Freedom". An introductory essay presents an overview of Audi's position on action and situates the various chapters in a broader context. The volume divides into four main parts. Part 1 develops an account of the basic concepts featured in intentionalistic explanations of action and in familiar theories of the nature of action. Part 2 employs these concepts in developing a theory of the explanation of action. In the light of this theoretical background, part 3 defends a compatibilist view of freedom and moral responsibility (including responsibility for one's character), and (in a single chapter) sketches accounts of practical reasoning and of self-deception in preparation or an argument that actions promoted by self-deceptive practical reasoning may nevertheless be both free and rational. Finally, part 4 advances a view of rationality and rational action. -- from http://www.jstor.org (May 26, 2011).
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Moral Responsibility Freedom and Compulsion
SelfDeception and Practical Reasoning
Responsible Action and Virtuous Character
Modalities of Knowledge and Freedom
Rationality and Valuation
Weakness of Will and Rational Action
An Internalist Conception of Rational Action
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