## Advances in Game TheoryThe description for this book, Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52), will be forthcoming. |

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### Contents

Some Topics in TwoPerson Games | 1 |

Games With a Random Move | 29 |

A Search Game | 39 |

The Rendezvous Value of a Metric Space | 49 |

Generalized Gross Substitutability and Extremization | 55 |

Adaptive Competitive Decision | 69 |

Infinite Games of Perfect Information | 85 |

Continuous Games of Perfect Information | 103 |

The Tensor Composition of Nonnegative Games | 307 |

On the Cardinality of Solutions of FourPerson Constant | 327 |

By Guillermo Owen | 345 |

ThreePerson Cooperative Games Without Side Payments | 377 |

Some Thoughts on the Theory of Cooperative Games | 407 |

The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games | 443 |

Stable Payoff Configurations for Quota Games | 477 |

On the Bargaining Set 3110 of mQuota Games | 501 |

A Theory of Pursuit and Evasion | 113 |

A Variational Approach to Differential Games | 127 |

A Differential Game Without Pure Strategy Solutions | 175 |

The Convergence Problem for Differential Games II | 195 |

Markov Games | 211 |

Homogeneous Games III | 255 |

Solutions of Compound Simple Games | 267 |

A Property of Stability Possessed by Certain Imputations | 513 |

Coalition Bargaining in nPerson Games | 531 |

The nPerson Bargaining Game | 547 |

Valuation of nPerson Games | 577 |

Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games | 627 |

A General Solution for Finite Noncooperative Games Based | 651 |

### Other editions - View all

Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52) Melvin Dresher,Lloyd S. Shapley,Albert William Tucker Limited preview - 2016 |

### Common terms and phrases

A-stable admissible set Annals of Mathematics arbitrary assume bargaining set called characteristic function choose coalition coalition structure components consider contains contradiction convex cooperative games COROLLARY corresponding counter objection defined definition denote determined differential differential games distribution dominates elements endpoints equation equivalent example exists finite follows game theory given Hence holds implies imputation inequalities K-game Lemma linearly equivalent m-coalitions Mathematics Study matrix maximal maximin minimizing mixed strategy n-person game Neumann obtain optimal strategy pair payoff vector play positive possible Princeton problem PROOF prove pure strategies quota split RAND Corporation real numbers regular decomposition risk-dominance saddle-point satisfies Section sequence Shapley Shapley value simple game space stable strictly effective subgame subset Suppose symmetric Theorem three-person tion two-person unknown payoffs value function weak player