After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation

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SUNY Press, 1990 - Technology & Engineering - 162 pages
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This book analyzes the politics of state regulatory decision-making in telecommunications after the AT&T divestiture in 1984. The author takes a political-economy approach that explains how interest groups and institutional factors have shaped different state policies. He shows that the structure and composition of state regulatory institutions have important effects on pricing and competition in the telecommunications industry.

The innovative methodology of this work combines qualitative empirical analysis from the entire U.S. with case studies of eight states. It identifies the deregulation winners and losers by examining the impact of changes in local and long-distance price structures on different groups, including users of telecommunications services, small businesses, residential consumers, and rural residents. The book includes recommendations for improving state policy.
 

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Contents

Telecommunications Regulatory History
1
Political Economic Theories of Deregulation
17
Telecommunications Economics and State Regulatory Options
31
Interest Group Formation
45
Quantitative Analysis of State Decisions
63
Comparative Case Study New Jersey and New York
87
Case Studies of Innovative States Illinois Virginia and Vermont
103
Bypassing the Regulators U S West
113
Conclusions
125
NOTES
138
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
147
INDEX
157
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About the author (1990)

Paul E. Teske is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Management at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, and is an Affiliated Research Fellow with the Center for Telecommunications and Information Studies of Columbia University.

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