After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq

Front Cover
Rand Arroyo Center, 2008 - History - 273 pages
0 Reviews
The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations."--BOOK JACKET.

From inside the book

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

CHAPTER EIGHT
3
CENTCOM Operational Planning
6
CHAPTER THREE
21
Copyright

24 other sections not shown

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2008)

Nora Bensahel (Ph.D. Political Science, Stanford University) is a policy analyst at RAND. Research focus includes military strategy, Middle East security, and military coalitions.

Bibliographic information