After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq
Rand Arroyo Center, 2008 - History - 273 pages
The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations."--BOOK JACKET.
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CENTCOM Operational Planning
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agencies April April 12 Arab Arab League Ba'ath Party Baghdad Bremer CENTCOM CFLCC challenges Chapter civilian coalition forces Coalition Provisional Authority Coalition USAID commander contracts coordination Corps Council CPA officials CPA staff CPA's Critical Coalition deployed developed efforts Essential Coalition February Garner ICDC Important Coalition infrastructure insurgency interagency International Interview with ORHA Interview with TFIV Interviews with CPA Interviews with OSD Iraq's Iraqi armed forces Iraqi army Iraqi government Iraqi Interim Government Iraqi military Iraqi police issues July June leaders litde looting major combat operations March military forces Ministry NGOs November organizations ORHA official OSD official personnel Phase political post-conflict Rajiv Chandrasekaran Rebuilding Iraq reconstruction responsibility role Saddam Saddam Hussein Secretary of Defense security forces senior advisors Shi'ite structure Sunni task TFIV official tion troops U.S. forces U.S. General Accounting U.S. government U.S. military UNDP United Washington Post York