After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq

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Rand Corporation, 2008 - History - 273 pages
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This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
 

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Contents

CHAPTER ONE Introduction
1
CHAPTER TWO Military Planning Efforts
5
CHAPTER THREE Civilian Planning Efforts
21
CHAPTER FOUR Task Force IV
41
CHAPTER FIVE The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
53
CHAPTER SIX Humanitarian Planning
73
CHAPTER SEVEN Combat Operations During Phase IV
81
CHAPTER EIGHT The Coalition Provisional Authority
101
CHAPTER NINE Building New Iraqi Security Forces
121
CHAPTER TEN Governance and Political Reconstruction
159
CHAPTER ELEVEN Economic Policy
195
CHAPTER TWELVE Essential Services and Infrastructure
211
CHAPTER THIRTEEN Assessing Postwar Efforts
233
APPENDIX Strategic Studies Institutes Mission Matrix for Iraq
245
Bibliography
255
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About the author (2008)

Nora Bensahel (Ph.D. Political Science, Stanford University) is a policy analyst at RAND. Research focus includes military strategy, Middle East security, and military coalitions.

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