Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems: AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002, Revised Papers
Julian Padget, Onn Shehory, David Parkes, Norman Sadeh, William E. Walsh
Springer, Mar 10, 2003 - Electronic commerce - 341 pages
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, AMEC 2002, held in Bologna, Italy in July 2002 during the AAMAS 2002 conference. The 20 revised full papers presented together with an introductory survey by the volume editors were carefully selected and improved during two rounds of reviewing and revision. The book gives a unique overview of the state of the art of designing mechanisms and systems for agent-mediated e-commerce- The papers are organized in topical sections on electronic auctions, negotiations, and electronic markets.
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A Comparison among Bidding Algorithms for Multiple Auctions
Bidtree Ordering in IDA Combinatorial Auction WinnerDetermination
DifferentialRjevela tion VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
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algorithm allocatable AMEC approach Artificial Intelligence assume assumption auction mechanism auction protocol automated bidders bidding agents bidtree branching factor bundle co-evolution combination combinatorial auctions complex consider constraints cost deadline defined described distribution double auction economic efficient allocation Electronic Commerce elicitation policy elicitor English auction evaluate example expected revenue feedback game theory given implement increases increment information set interaction Knapsack licenses lower bound maximizes mechanism design Mediated Electronic Commerce minimal minimal-revelation Multi-Agent Systems multi-attribute multiple Nash equilibrium NegF negotiation protocol node number of queries ontology order queries outcome Padget paper parameters participants possible preference elicitation price function private values problem Proc profit programming PRSDR random resource reveal Sandholm scenario scoring rule Section seller specific spectrum auctions task tion Tuomas Sandholm upper bound utility function valuation function value queries vi(b Vickrey auction winner determination