Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15. 2003, Revised Selected Papers
Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, William E. Walsh
Springer Science & Business Media, Oct 18, 2004 - Computers - 153 pages
The design of intelligent trading agents, mechanisms, and systems has received growingattentionin the agentsandmultiagentsystemscommunities in ane?ort to address the increasing costs of search, transaction, and coordination which follows from the increasing number of Internet-enabled distributed electronic markets. Furthermore, new technologies and supporting business models are - sulting in a growing volume of open and horizontally integrated markets for trading of an increasingly diverse set of goods and services. However, growth of technologies for such markets requires innovative solutions to a diverseset of - isting and novel technical problems which we are only beginning to understand. Speci?cally, distributed markets present not only traditional economic problems but also introduce novel and challenging computational issues that are not r- resentedin the classiceconomicsolution concepts.Novelto agent-mediatedel- tronic commerce are considerations involving the computation substrates of the agents and the electronic institutions that supports, and trading, and also the human-agent interface (involving issues of preference elicitation, representation, reasoningandtrust).Insum, agent-mediatedelectronictraderequiresprincipled design(fromeconomicsandgametheory)andincorporatesnovelcombinationsof theories from di?erent disciplines such as computer science, operations research, arti?cial intelligence and distributed systems. The collection of above-mentioned issues and challenges has crystallized into a new, consolidated agent research ?eld that has become a focus of attention in recent years: agent-mediated electronic commerce.
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algorithm allocation rule AMEC approach Artificial Intelligence bargaining strategies bundle buy order competition compute concession strategy consumers convex preferences decommitment strategy denote depots distribution economic knowledge efficiency Electronic Commerce experiments Faratin function fuzzy constraints given grid heuristic strategies incentive compatible increases kmax L2 norm Lemma loads market making strategy maximize mechanism design methods mixed strategies multi-agent multi-agent systems Myerson auction Nash equilibrium number of articles number of buyers number of offers orthogonal strategy orthogonal-DF oscillations paper Pareto search strategies Pareto-efficient payoff payoff matrix performance PLAT preference elicitation problem producer’s producers profit pure strategy quality of service random reject reverse strategy samples Sandholm search space Section sell order seller agent seller’s expected utility simulation single-offer TLA solution strategy profile surplus target niches Team tradeoffs trading agents trucks user’s Vickrey auction virtual valuations zero