Agreements: A Philosophical and Legal Study
Combining rigorous philosophical analysis with a deep knowledge of law, this study of agreements illuminates legal doctrine by philosophical theory and vice versa. Against the prevailing philosophical view of agreements, the book argues that they are to be understood in terms not of promises but of offer and acceptance. Topics covered include the obligations associated with agreements; the practical reasoning that leads parties to make and perform agreements; the relation between agreement and intention; and the reasons the State has to intervene in agreements. There are also separate chapters devoted to doctrines of agreement in the laws of contract, competition and conspiracy.
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action actus reus agree analysis apply argued argument Article 101 Atiyah Bayer Black breach Chapter claim communication Compare competition law concept of agreement concerns concerted practice concurrence conditionality conspiracy contract law crime criminal deontological depends discussed in section distinction distinguishes example existence fact false function further Chap Gellhorn Gilbert gives Py ifY does Ay implies KĻotz Kovacic means mens rea Model Penal Code normative noted in section objection Odudu offence offer and acceptance offer–acceptance model ofthe other’s paras parties party’s Peel plausible premiss principle promises to X proposal proposition question reading relation reliance Richardson 2011 Searle section 1.1 sense Sherman Act Simester Smith speech acts state’s sufficient condition tacit theory thesis true unclear unilateral unilateral contracts X does Ax X promises X’s obligation X’s offer X’s promise X’s reasoning Y does Ay Zimmerman 1996