Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq's Unstable Triangle

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Government Printing Office, Jan 3, 2012 - Biography & Autobiography - 223 pages
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Al-Qaida’s resurgence, despite its limitations, presents a continuing security challenge in Iraq, and the tribal factor remains a significant element in the security equation.  Among the conclusions of the study are that Iraq’s Sunni tribes remain an important element in the country’s political life and in the security equation and will continue to be the major arena for Al-Qaida’s recruitment efforts and operations.  As such, it will be necessary for the Iraqi government to craft realistic and effective policies that will address the Sunni tribes in order to undercut tribal support for Al-Qaida if the latter is to be defeated decisively.  Includes an extensive notes and Bibliography references for further reading

 

 

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Contents

The Human Terrain The Tribal Factor in Iraqi Society
1
AlQ1ida Tackles the Tribes
5
AlQaida Alienates the Tribes
9
Mobilizing the Tribes Against AlEdda
23
The U S Strategy Matures and the Awakening Develops
33
The Shayks Positions Assured
38
The Tribal War Against AlOida
44
Albida Responds
48
AlQaida Adapts
54
The Tribes and the Iraqi Government A Rocky Relationship
61
The Evolving Tribal Environment
89
AlL1idas Own CarrotandStick Approach
100
Conclusions and Prospects
122
Notes
131
About the Author
207

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About the author (2012)

About the Author

 

Norman Cigar is director of regional studies and a Minerva Research Chair holder at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.  Before retiring, he was on the staff of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, where he taught military theory, strategy and policy, military history, and regional studies.  Previously, he was a senior political military analyst in the pentagon, where he was responsible for the Middle East in the Office of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and supported the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Congress with intelligence.  He also represented the Army on national-level intelligence issues with the interagency intelligence community.  During the Gulf War, he was the Army's senior political-military intelligence staff officer on the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Task Force.

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