## Algorithmic Game Theory: First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Paderborn, Germany, April 30 - May 2, 2008, ProceedingsThisvolumecontainsthepaperspresentedattheFirstInternationalSymposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2008) held from April 30 to May 2 in Paderborn, Germany. The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from computer science, economics and mathematics to present and discuss original research at the intersection of algorithms and game theory. It is intended to cover all important areas of algorithmic game theory, such as: solution concepts in game theory; game classes (e. g. , bimatrix, potential, Bayesian); exact and appro- mate computation of equilibria; convergence and learning in games; complexity classesingametheory;algorithmicaspectsof?xed-pointtheorems;mechanisms, incentives and coalitions; cost-sharing algorithms and analysis; computational aspects of market equilibria; computational problems in economics, ?nance, - cision theory and pricing; auction algorithms and analysis; price of anarchy and its relatives; representations of games and their complexity; economic aspects of distributed computing and the Internet; network formation on the Internet; congestion, routing and network design games; game-theoretic approaches to networking problems; Byzantine game theory. There were 60 submissions. Each submission was reviewed by three P- gramme Committee members. The committee decided to accept 28 papers. The programme also included three invited talks from outstanding researchers ChristosPapadimitriou,NobelMemorialPrizewinnerReinhardSeltenandPaul Spirakis. We would like to thank all the Programme Committee members and the external reviewers who assisted them in their work. The members of the Organizing Committee as well as the developer of the EasyChair conference system deserve our gratitude for their contributions throughout the preparations. |

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### Contents

The Influence of Link Restrictions on Random Selfish Routing | 22 |

Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy | 33 |

The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited | 46 |

Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games | 58 |

Bertrand Competition in Networks | 70 |

On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems | 83 |

WindowGames between TCP Flows | 95 |

Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Network | 109 |

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Algebraic Communication Complexity | 206 |

The Price of Anarchy of a Network Creation Game with Exponential Payoff | 218 |

A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games | 230 |

Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium | 242 |

The Local and Global Price of Anarchy of Graphical Games | 255 |

Approximate Nash Equilibria for Multiplayer Games | 267 |

Subjective vs Objective Reality The Risk of Running Late | 279 |

On the Hardness and Existence of QuasiStrict Equilibria | 291 |

Fast Myopic and Concurrent | 121 |

Frugal Routing on Wireless AdHoc Networks | 133 |

Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture | 145 |

Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria | 158 |

Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions | 170 |

A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling | 182 |

Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize | 194 |

The Price of Stochastic Anarchy | 303 |

Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems | 315 |

Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? | 327 |

Noncooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies | 337 |

GroupStrategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location | 350 |

362 | |

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### Common terms and phrases

action acyclic mechanisms agent algorithm allocation approximation arbitrary assigned assume best response bidder bimatrix games budget clicks coalition competitive ratio conﬁguration congestion games consider corresponding cost sharing cost-sharing deﬁned Deﬁnition denote diﬀerent edge eﬃcient exists extension-parallel ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬂow fraction Game Theory goodput greedy greedy algorithm Heidelberg latency latency functions Lemma linear LNCS load lower bound M-implements machine makespan maximize maximum mixed strategy Nash equilibrium nodes NP-hard oﬀer optimal Papadimitriou parameter path payment payoff player polynomial price of anarchy problem proﬁle proﬁt Proof prove pure Nash equilibrium pure strategy quasi-strict equilibrium random satisﬁes schedule sellers server Shapley value slots social choice function social cost solution solution concept Speciﬁcally Springer stable graph subset subsidy SuppNE symmetric Theorem traﬃc truthful mechanism upper bound users utility variable vector vertex vertices