The author creates a theory of alliances by deductive reasoning about the international system, by integrating ideas from neorealism, coalition formation, bargaining and game theory, and by empirical generalization from international history. Using cases from 1879 to 1914 to present a theory of alliance formation and management in a multipolar international system, he focuses particularly on three cases - Austria-Germany, Austria-Germany-Russia and France-Russia - and examines 22 episodes of intra-alliance bargaining.
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adversary Agadir crisis agreement alignments alliance bargaining alliance commitments alliance formation alliance game ally ally's alternative ambassador ance attack Austria Austria-Hungary Austro-German alliance Baghdad Railway balance of power Balkan Wars bandwagoning bargaining power score behavior benefits Bismarck Bosnia Britain British coalition common interests concert Concert of Europe concessions conflict costs Czar defection defense dependence deterrence diplomatic effect enemy England entente European example factors fear of abandonment forces formal France France and Russia France's Franco-Russian alliance French gains game theory Germany Germany's Grey Ibid incentives increased interaction International issue Italy Jervis less loyalty ment military mobilization moderate Morocco motive multipolar system mutual negotiations neutrality norm obligations offensive one's opponent other's outcome parties partner payoffs Poincaré political possible potential promise reduced Reinsurance Treaty relations relationship restrain Russia Sazonov security dilemma Serbia spiral strategic interest theory threat Three Emperors tion treaty Triple Alliance Triple Entente worried
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Pivotal Deterrence: Third-party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace
Timothy W. Crawford
Limited preview - 2003