Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Emerald Group Publishing, Apr 16, 2009 - Business & Economics - 284 pages
While Advances continues to publish papers from any area of Finance, the focus of this issue is on corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. Included in the volume are papers focusing on: the impact of deregulation and corporate structure on productive efficiency; the effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS; board monitoring and access to debt financing; institutional investors; and managerial stability and payout policy.
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Chapter 2 Implications of cash hoarding for shareholders
The effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS No 99
Chapter 4 Management views on corporate governance and firm performance
Chapter 5 Board monitoring and access to debt financing
do political connections matter?
Chapter 7 Legal institutions democracy and financial sector development
Evidence from voting of mutual funds in Israel
Chapter 9 Does corporate governance matter? Korean banks in the postfinancial crisis era
Does state regulation matter?
Other editions - View all
access to debt ACHANGE agency problems analysis Asian financial crisis audit committee banks board composition board meeting frequency board monitoring board of directors capital cash level cash-hoarding coefficient compensation Compustat control variables corporate governance correlation debt financing dependent variable deregulation director remuneration DIRREM DIVIDEND dummy variable effect electric utilities equity estimation financial development Financial Economics financial statement fraud firm performance firm’s foreign ownership fraud risk factor Governance and Firm governance firms gross domestic product growth Hana Bank impact increase industry institutional investors institutional ownership investment Journal of Financial Korean legal institutions lenders logit Malaysia managerial measure mutual fund mutual fund managers negative NON-COMPETITION p-values percent percentage politically connected firms positive PRIVATE CREDIT productive efficiency proxy ratio regression relationship respondents returns sample Shleifer significantly Silanes suggest Table total assets voting YES YES