An Independent and Accountable Imf
The liberalization of capital movements has deeply affected the IMF's business. Crises occur with more violence and leave deeper scars. The Fund has mobilized ever larger rescue packages and yet it has often failed to achieve its stated aims. Does this mean that the IMF must transform itself, or even as has been suggested, that it has become useless? The new world economy still needs a Fund, but many of its practices must be rethought and its role redefined. Its traditional views of exchange rate regimes and the desirability of unfettered capital mobility no longer correspond to the situation of many developing countries. Its mode of intervention needs to recognize that "21st century crises" differ fundamentally from those that dominated during its first fifty years of existence. The continuous blurring of roles between the IMF and the World Bank is fraught with dangers; both institutions must redefine their functions. The answer is not an international lender of last resort. This report presents a detailed proposal for a new IMF, insisting on accountability and governance.Jose de Gregorio is at Universidad de Chile, Santiago; Barry Eichengreen is at the University of California at Berkeley; Takatoshi Ito is at Hitotsubashi University; and Charles Wyplosz is at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
The IMF and Crisis Prevention
The IMF and Crisis Management
4 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
agendas Andrew Crockett argue Asian crisis bailing banking crises Brazil capital account capital account liberalization capital flows capital mobility central bank CEPR Chile conditionality contagion country's credibility creditors crisis countries currency current account deficit debt decisions devaluation developing countries discussion domestic effective emerging markets enhance example exchange rate regime Executive Board Executive Directors finance ministers financial crises financial markets Financial Stability financial system fiscal policy Fitch IBCA fixed exchange rate Flemming Larsen forecasts foreign Fund Fund's fundamentals global IMF decision-making IMF programmes IMF's independence Indonesia inflows interest rates Interim Committee international financial institutions investors issues Jon Cunliffe Korea liquidity loans macroeconomic macroeconomic policies mandate member countries Mexican Mexico monetary policy moral hazard package political pre-qualification private sector problem proposal quota recent regulation reserves response restructuring risk role Russia shareholders staff and management standards structural policies surveillance Thailand transparency voting World Bank