An Introduction to Auction Theory

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Oxford University Press, 2005 - Business & Economics - 178 pages
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"The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. Moreover, auction theory is now seen as an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory." -- BACK COVER.

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Private Values
Common Value
Affiliated Values
Mechanism Design
Multiple Objects
A Probability
B Differential Equations
Index of Notations 173

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About the author (2005)

Professor Flavio Menezes is the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics at the ANU. He has published widely in economics of auctions and is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert. Flavio Menezes has extensive teaching experience in the areas of game theory,
industrial organization, and on the theory of incentives. He has presented seminars and delivered lectures in the Americas, Europe, and the Asia Pacific Region, has lectured to both academic audiences and practitioners, and has rich consulting experience, including advising internationally on a
privatisation model for utilities, providing advice on electricity regulatory reform, and reviewing government procurement practices. P. K. Monteiro received his PhD from IMPA in 1988. He has been at several institutions including UFRJ (1989-1993), IMPA (1994-1996, 1998-99), and EPGE-FGV
(1999-present). He has been visiting fellow at CORE (1996-1997) and Copenhagen University (1997-1998). Monteiro works in General Equilibrium, Auction Theory, and Non-linear Pricing.

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