An Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

Front Cover
Brown University, 1989 - Liability (Law) - 360 pages
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Contents

Introduction
2
Section HI Overview of the Law
11
Summary
30
Negligent Victims Recovery Scale
32
Current Status of Comparative Negligence
33
Current Status of Multiple Tortfeasors
36
Index of Cases
39
Equilibria in a JudgmentProof World
41
Summary
97
Introduction and Literature Survey
100
The Problem of Recovery Rules
103
Modeling the Shallow and Deep Pockets Problems
107
Expected Liability Shares
109
Social Indifference Curves
119
Examples Ill Section V General Analysis
126
A The Shallow Pockets Problem
130

Introduction
42
Survey of the Literature
45
The Shallow Pockets Problem
53
Dx 1x
57
Dz 1ax
58
Dx 4x + 1
66
Dxy 1xy
71
Dxy 1xy
72
Dxy 1xy
74
Reaction Curves and Equilibria for r r r
75
Dxy 8x + ly +1
77
Dxy 1x + 1y
79
General Reaction Functions
84
Stable and Unstable Equilibria
86
Dxyz lxyz
93
Zxyr 1xyr
95
B The Deep Pockets Problem
133
The Active Victim
135
Dxyz lxy
137
Summary
141
Appendix Critique of Summers Approach
143
Stackelberg Behavior and the Efficiency of Liability Rules
145
Introduction
146
Game Theory Models and Liability Rules
149
A Criterion for Stackelberg Efficiency
153
Shallow Pockets and Stackelberg Efficiency
159
Typical Reaction Functions Dxy lxy
161
Regular Games and Liability Rules
164
Some Illustrative Examples
168
Efficient Liability Rules Example 8
174
Summary
175
References
177

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