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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AND EFFICIENT RULES
A FAMILY WITH ONE DOMINATING SPOUSE
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absence of dominance age difference alimony allocation altruism analysis assume assumption Becker breach career opportunities chapter child support choice variables cohort common children comparative advantages concerning contribution custody cycle utilities denoted divorce rule duration of marriage economic Ellman envelope theorem equality equilibrium et.al examine expected life cycle family-specific public female sample gains to marriage hazard function hence hours a week implies income increase individuals induce investments in marriage-specific joint property jointly efficient level labor supply male sample marginal utility marital decision-making marriage contract marriage-specific capital married maximize mother Nash bargaining Nash bargaining game non-cooperative objective function obtained optimal order conditions P-value parameters parents Pareto improving possible preferences presence of dominance probability of divorce Proof of proposition public provision result risk aversion risk of divorce second period sectors solution spousal support strictly concave threat points Tobit model transfer utility functions wage rate welfare wife's women